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INTRODUCTION: PREDATORY LENDING IN CONTEXT

I have argued elsewhere that black people’s money is literally a
distinctive currency worth less than white people’s money, both socially
and materially.1 Through blacks’ historic confinement to segregated
markets immune to legal attack and the operation of a culture of dealing
that is permeated by economic stereotypes and practices borne of blacks’
unequal material conditions, money in the hands of black Americans has
come to be devalued like the currency of a “Third World” country.2 The
devaluation has taken on a life of its own. The assumption that black
people’s money is worth less taints commercial transactions of all sorts and
perpetuates blacks’ subordinate economic status. Nowhere is the adverse
impact of this interaction of race, culture, law, and economics better
reflected than in the area of personal finance and the lack of success that
blacks encounter in transactions with financial institutions and other firms
dealing in money as a commodity.
Black Americans experience a number of problems in their efforts to
obtain and use credit.3 Of particular concern is their vulnerability to socalled “predatory lenders.” Predatory lending is “characterized [by] a
combination of unfair loan terms [particularly high interest rates and fees]
and pressure tactics that limit the information and choices available to
borrowers, especially those targeted because of particular vulnerabilities.”4
1. See Regina Austin, “Black People’s Money:” An Essay on the Interaction of Law,
Economics, and Culture in the Context of Race (July 26, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the American University Law Review) (providing an extended discussion of this
thesis). This research is grounded on the work of Princeton sociologist Viviana Zelizer. See
generally VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994) (exploring how
people earmark money by infusing it with social significance based on, among other things,
the purpose for which it is used (i.e. a gift) or the identity of the possessor (i.e. women or the
welfare poor)).
2. See discussion infra Part III.C (detailing how blacks are identified with the cash
economy and how their money is therefore thought to be worth less).
3. See Brett Williams, Babies and Banks: The “Reproductive Underclass” and the
Raced, Gendered Maskings of Debt, in RACE 348, 360-61 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek
eds., 1994) (recognizing that blacks have greater access to credit cards than to mortgages).
Blacks either experience too little credit of the right kind or too much credit of the wrong
kind. The first category relates to credit discrimination as it is commonly understood. The
second category includes what is considered predatory lending.
4. Deborah Goldstein, Note, Protecting Consumers from Predatory Lenders: Defining
the Problem and Moving Toward Workable Solutions, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 255
(2000).
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Examples of targeted consumers include women, minorities, low-income
wage earners, and senior citizens.5 The chief objects of criticism are
financial firms that conduct business in what is variously known as the
subprime, secondary, fringe, or alternative market, including payday
lenders, car title pawn operators, small loan and mortgage companies, rentto-own stores, check cashing outlets, and rapid refund tax services. Not all
subprime lenders behave scandalously, of course, though the financial
services industry as a whole might be criticized for not adequately
regulating those entities essentially engaged in credit scams.
There are many trenchant, critical legal assessments of the practices of
predatory lenders. Commentators typically call for the application of usury
restrictions to curb the interest charged on transactions that lenders insist
are not loans6 or suitability requirements that would compel lenders to
determine if a loan is appropriate for a borrower given her or his capacity
to make the required repayments.7 Others criticize the unfairness of the
arbitration clauses that make borrowers’ efforts to resort to the courts
impossible or decry the scarcity of publicly supported lawyers available to
represent borrowers in fee-generating matters involving the more powerful
and organized forces of the lending industry.8 Rather than reiterate the
arguments that others have made, I want to investigate the subject of
predatory lending from a different frame of reference.
Legal discussions of predatory lending do not typically proceed from
thick, rich descriptions of the contexts in which the transactions occur. The
reader gets only a vague sense of the borrowers’ relative socioeconomic
status and the economic leverage that lending entities have over them. The
analysis particularly lacks explanations of why the borrowers needed credit
or what their pressing debts or obligations were, why the sources of credit
available to them were limited to those in the fringe market, what the
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction were like, and
how the borrowers’ resort to such credit fits into larger patterns of dealing

5. See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 98-103 (2002) (evaluating a variety of studies offering conflicting data
regarding the demographic characteristics of the customers of payday loans). The
Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions found that these customers have an average
income of $25,131. Id. at 99. Both Wisconsin and Illinois studies determined that the
majority of payday customers are women. Id. at 100. Additionally, a study from the
American Association of Retired People found that “low-income and minority households
are significantly more likely to have [cash-checking outlets] located within one mile of their
homes than higher-income and nonminority households.” Id.
6. E.g., Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial
Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking
About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 657-66 (2000).
7. E.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 133-45.
8. Id.
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with matters of personal finance. Contextual analysis might supply
answers to some of these questions.
Contextual analysis in the law is a powerful tool for discerning patterns
of control, coercion, subjugation, resistance, and prosperity because it
allows the legal analyst to address a problem by taking its “situatedness”
fully into account.9 Contextual analysis can zoom in on the local level and
scrutinize the intimate details of human or social interaction that are in the
foreground of a problem. It can also take a wide angle view of the
institutional setting and other structural factors that form the backdrop of
the problem. Contextual analysis permits consideration of how the law can
both solve a problem and exacerbate it at the same time. It allows for the
formulation of legal solutions to subjugation that are multidimensional or
holistic.
Closer examination of the context of ordinary, everyday local
commercial transactions has the potential for revealing the discrimination
embedded in segmented markets and the cultures that govern their
transactions.10 Contextual analysis is in addition likely to identify the
prejudices and stereotypes that are ingrained in those cultures that silently
skew the outcome of countless individual transactions that occur in such
markets every single day.11 In lieu of overt bias, contextual analysis
facilitates consideration of more subtle factors such as contradictions
between law on the books and the reality of these laws as enforced; the
hegemonic processes by which the replication of disparities in rank and
resources is made to seem like the product of the world view or consent of
the subordinated; and the depoliticization of economic issues that results in
the disenfranchisement of financially disadvantaged consumer-citizens.
Insofar as “predatory lending” is concerned, contextual analysis would
focus on the institutional structure and culture of the market for consumer
9. See Iain Ramsay, Consumer Credit Law, Distributive Justice and the Welfare State,
15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 177, 189 (1995) (citing Foucault’s suggestion of “studying local
manifestations of power, the politics of >how things work at the level of ongoing
subjugation’” and “patterning of restraint, coercion, power and opportunities” as an
illustration of the need to look beyond the neo-classical approach of examining the structure
of selling and lending credit in low-income credit markets); see also Regina Austin, Of
False Teeth and Biting Critiques: Jones v. Fisher in Context, 15 TOURO L. REV. 389, 389-90
(1999) (enumerating the variety of factors that a reader should consider according to
contextual/cultural studies). This Essay applied contextual analysis to an appellate decision
reducing the damages awarded in a battery case involving a plaintiff who was a nursing
home worker and her former employers.
10. See Ramsay, supra note 9, at 193-94 (recognizing that the supposedly race-neutral
rules are still discriminatory in impact, and thus, the image of “the impersonal market
mechanism coldly allocating capital and credit to the most profitable investment and
borrower” regardless of race and social status is in reality misleading). Some examples of
facially neutral practices include using postal codes to assess credit applications instead of
formally “redlining” and giving additional weight to housing tenure and employment. Id.
11. Id.

AUSTIN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

1/17/2005 11:17:48 AM

PREDATORY LENDING AND CREDIT DEMOCRATIZATION

1221

credit. More contextual data about the sources of the borrowers’ economic
vulnerability, as well as the financial practices, preferences, and
perceptions both they and the lenders bring to financial transactions, would
be very useful in formulating legal reforms or supporting alternative
sources of credit that might enable borrowers to accomplish their economic
goals. Information regarding the context surrounding predatory lending
might also counter untested assumptions about the ignorance and
profligacy of borrowers of subprime credit, assumptions that undermine the
movement to protect them. Moreover, economic success or failure is
viewed as a personal matter. People do not talk about their financial
difficulties because of the moral stigma attached to being in debt, even if it
is caused by circumstances beyond the debtors’ control.12 Both those in
debt and those not in debt discuss financial liability in terms of blame,
complicity, and loss of control.13 Contextual analysis would expose the
structural predicates to what is spoken of largely as a matter of individual
failure. Finally, debtors are not the only parties impacted by predatory
lending. Contextual analysis would also reveal the impact of predatory
lending on nonparties to the transactions, namely the families of the debtors
and the communities where they live and work.14 In sum, then, richer,
more detailed and nuanced narratives about the difficulties borrowers
encounter would facilitate the politicization of issues of credit availability
and creditor abuse.
Only a few judicial decisions offer a glimpse of an alternative,
contextually-based perspective on predatory lending in the subprime
market. Smith v. Short Term Loans, L.L.C.,15 for example, is a case
challenging the legality of a series of payday loans.16 A payday loan is the
modern variant of salary selling or the salary advance.17 In the typical
transaction, a borrower obtains a small advance on his salary of between
12. See Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion: Debtor
Abuse or Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 55 (1998) (observing that the notion of
indebtedness as an undesirable state dates back to Biblical times and the requirement in
Deuteronomy that every seven years there shall be a release of debts).
13. See Williams, supra note 3, at 355 (describing how credit-card debt is personalized
by both those who carry debt and those who do not, such that all credit-card users think that
debtors are complicit and that there is some type of shameful blame associated with that
debt).
14. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR
THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 205-14 (employing an economic externality analysis to
describe the adverse spillover effect of high-cost lending on families, neighborhoods, and
entire communities).
15. No. 99-C1288, 2001 WL 127303 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2001).
16. Id. at *19.
17. See generally Mark H. Haller & John V. Alviti, Loansharking in American Cities:
Historical Analysis of a Marginal Enterprise, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 125, 125-26 (1977)
(tracing the history of salary lending from the post-Civil War period through the early 1960s
and the replacement of old-time salary lenders with modern racketeer loansharks).
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$100 to $500 for a period of two weeks for a fee of between $15 and $35
which represents an effective annual interest rate of between 300 and
400%.18 The borrower writes a check for the amount of the loan and the
fee which the lender agrees to hold until the borrower’s next payday. In
essence, the borrower writes a post-dated check for which he has
insufficient funds in the bank and receives in exchange the face amount of
the loan in the form of cash or a check. Two weeks later, the borrower can
redeem the check by paying the lender the full amount owed, allow the
check to be cashed, or roll the loan over.
The typical two-week time frame of the payday loan leaves borrowers
with little opportunity to accumulate the surplus required to pay off the
debt.19 Rollovers are quite common. The borrower can pay a fee to extend
the loan which means that the lender keeps the check and the borrower has
an additional two weeks to redeem it. Alternatively, the borrower can take
out a new loan with the same or a different payday lender and use the
proceeds of the new loan to pay off the old obligation. Sometimes the new
obligation is taken out in the name of the borrower’s spouse or coaccountholder. It is through rollover after rollover that payday loan
customers become entrapped in what sympathetic commentators consider
an “insidious downward spiral”20 or “a vicious cycle of indebtedness”21
from which borrowers find it very difficult to extricate themselves. Payday
lenders require payment of the principal in full and do not allow for partial
payment.22 As a result, some borrowers wind up paying renewal fees in
amounts significantly exceeding what was borrowed without ever reducing
the principal balance.23
Payday loans appeal to borrowers who have “maxed out” or exhausted
the limits on their credit cards, find pawning their valuables embarrassing,
need a form of lending that does not demand a credit check, or realize that
bouncing checks is very expensive.24 Unfortunately, the practices of
payday lenders are intended to keep borrowers in perpetual debt. The

18. See Peter T. Kilborn, New Lenders with Huge Fees Thrive on Workers with Debts,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1999, at A1 (describing the increased numbers of payday lending
companies through the 1990s and the typical rates and fees associated with these loans).
19. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 6, at 632-33 (demonstrating quantitatively that, at
the average income levels of $25,000 and $35,000, there is a deficit of $196 and $34
respectively, after an individual pays for essential expenditures and the debt of the average
payday loan). The deficit grows substantially between $396 and $407 if one factors in the
maximum allowable payday loan. Id.
20. Id. at 633.
21. Johnson, supra note 5, at 4.
22. Id. at 3-4.
23. See, e.g., Kilborn, supra note 18, at A28 (noting the case of Shari Harris, a single
mother who started with one loan of $150 with a fee of $33 and, after picking up seven total
loans, wound up with a debt of $1,900 for which she was paying fees of $6,006 annually).
24. Id.
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bottom line is that payday loans may be suitable for coping with an
inadequate short-term cash flow situation but not for managing long-term
financial problems.25
One of the payday borrowers in Short Term Loans racked up a total of
fifteen loans over an eight-month period in amounts ranging between $120
and $400, and at annual percentage rates (APRs) ranging between 342.19
and 421.54%.26 During roughly the same period, the other borrower took
out eleven loans of between $150 and $400 with APRs between 342.19 and
391.07%.27
The borrowers executed post-dated checks with each
transaction and, after a certain point, wage assignments as well.28
In their lawsuit, the borrowers claimed Short Term Loans and two of its
agents who were attorneys charged exorbitant rates, failed to make proper
disclosures with the loans, and sent collection letters that suggested an
independent entity was attempting to collect the debts.29 Plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, the Illinois Wage Assignment Act, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act, as well as a claim of common law unconscionability.30 The
defendants’ response to the allegations is intriguing:
The defendants argue that plaintiffs were sophisticated “Ponzi schemers”
engaged in an elaborate check-kiting scheme.
Specifically, the
defendants argue that the plaintiffs would obtain payday loans from
multiple lenders on multiple occasions, using one loan to pay off
another. The defendants assert that the plaintiffs pledged their income to
several lenders, borrowing more than their weekly income, and knowing
that they could not repay all of the loans. The plaintiffs’ intent, argue the
defendants, was to defraud their creditors and to make a profit on this
scheme.31

25. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 72 (citing an industry trade group proposal that would
warn consumers of the limited benefit of payday loans and further notify potential
borrowers that payday loans are intended only “as a short-term cash-flow solution”).
26. Smith v. Short Term Loans, L.L.C., No. 99-C1288, 2001 WL 127303, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 14, 2001).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at *6.
30. Id. at *2.
31. Id. at *1; see LEE E. NORRGARD & JULIA M. NORRGARD, CONSUMER FRAUD: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK 31-32 (1998) (describing classic investment fraud schemes such as
the Ponzi scheme and the pyramid scheme). A Ponzi scheme is a type of pyramid scam. Id.
It is named after Charles Ponzi, who in 1920 enticed 30,000 to 40,000 people to buy ninety
day notes at fifty percent interest. Id. The early “investors” in the scheme were paid with
funds contributed by the later investors. Id. Each round of a Ponzi scheme requires an
increasingly greater number of investors in order to pay both the principal and interest due
to those who came before. Id. The scheme falls apart when the organizer can no longer con
enough new participants to pay the older investors. Id. See also CHARLES J. WOELFEL, THE
DICTIONARY OF BANKING 141 (1994) (defining check kiting as the “making use of fictitious
balances by drawing against uncollected funds”); GRETCHEN MORGENSON & CAMPBELL R.
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The plaintiffs in turn admitted using the proceeds of one loan to pay off
another.32 However, they asserted that they primarily used the loans “for
consumer purposes, such as buying children’s clothes and paying certain
utility bills.”33 Plaintiffs further argued that their pattern of borrowing was
a manifestation of “an unfortunate downward spiral of necessity
characteristic of payday borrowers . . . . Short Term Loans was well aware
of this characteristic spiral and actually facilitated it through its lending
practices.”34
Short Term Loans, then, is not a simple tale of an overreaching creditor
and ignorant, helpless borrowers. Rather, the borrowers seemingly treated
formally-made loans as if they were informal credit arrangements to be
artfully ducked and dodged like ordinary bills. The creditor, a formal
lender, for its part took profitable advantage of the informal, almost semiillegal, habits of the borrowers’ personal finance. This case essentially
boils down to a contest between the formal and the informal with the
creditor betting that the formal would ultimately prevail. The creditor
basically represented the formal. It was a corporate entity with a fixed
location, form contracts, and hired agents and lawyers.35 Nearly everything
else about the loan smacked of the informal: the amounts involved were
small, the loan terms were short, the nature of the interaction between the
borrowers and the creditors was frequent and face-to-face, and the course
of transacting mimicked the sort of money juggling desperate people
typically engage in to stretch their limited funds.36 The formal lender got
an edge over the borrowers by incorporating into the transaction informal
practices of dealing with debt with which the borrowers were probably
familiar, if not comfortable, like writing post-dated checks. The debt
accumulated like a gigantic snowball that the borrowers eventually could
not outrun. When the borrowers’ juggling act finally gave out, the lender
might have resorted to the criminal process which was available to it, as the
references to Ponzi schemes and check-kiting suggest; payday lenders have

HARVEY, THE NEW YORK TIMES DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND INVESTING 161 (2002)
(defining check kiting as “[t]he practice of depositing and drawing checks at two or more
banks and taking advantage of the time it takes for the second bank to collect funds from the
first bank”). In check kiting, a depositor makes a deposit in one bank and draws on that sum
by writing a check and depositing it in a second bank. The depositor thereby takes
advantage of the time it takes for the second bank to collect the funds from the first. Id. at
161.
32. Smith v. Short Term Loans, L.L.C., No. 99-C1288, 2001 WL 127303, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 14, 2001).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. (characterizing the defendant, Short Term Loans, LLC, as an entity located
in Elk Groves Village, Illinois with several agents who are also named defendants).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28 (detailing the character of the loans at
issue in Short Term Loans).
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prosecuted delinquent borrowers for writing “bad checks.”37 Instead Short
Term Loans allegedly employed deceptive debt collection procedures (a
vestige of the informal economy).38 The borrowers, however, had the
benefit of a bit of formality too; they invoked the legal remedies that are
available in the formal loan sector to hold the creditor at bay.39
Payday loans, then, involve the interplay between the formal and the
informal, both with regard to the structure of the lending entity and with
regard to the mode of transacting. It is difficult to determine whether as a
group small-sum borrowers, like the Short Term Loans plaintiffs, truly
benefit from having access to loans from a formal subprime lender or
whether in the end they are left with more debt and fewer options for
dealing with it than if they had been initially relegated to borrowing from a
more informal lending source, albeit one with less money to loan. Formal
lenders would justify the extension of their financial products to debtors
occupying the lowest socioeconomic tiers on the grounds that they, no less
than the affluent, are deserving of the benefits of a democratization of
credit, which is to say “formal credit.” Nonetheless, the suitability of the
options available to small-sum debtors is important because credit is an
essential component of the social safety net that protects citizen-consumers
from excessive financial insecurity.
In this Article, I explore the role of informality in small-sum lending. I
begin with a consideration of informal credit as a component of the social
safety net protecting the least well-off, small-sum borrowers.40 Next I look
at subprime lending in terms of how it fits into the overall market for smallsum loans by outlining the landscape of alternative sources of credit as
characterized by various combinations of formality and informality.41
From there, I speculate as to how individual subprime loan transactions are
facilitated by cultural understandings that cause small-sum borrowers to
prize both informality and cash as components of their financial dealings.42
37. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 78-80 (focusing on the unfair collection practices of
payday lenders and the practice of suing customers who default on loans under “bad-check”
laws). For instance, in a county court in Ohio, at least twelve payday lenders filed over 365
complaints, many of which included damages for the customers’ violations of laws
prohibiting consumers from writing checks not backed by sufficient funds in their checking
account. Id. at 79.
38. See Short Term Loans, 2001 WL 127303, at *10 (observing that the collection letter
sent to the plaintiffs “presents enough ambiguity that an unsophisticated consumer might be
misled”); see also id. at *2 (describing the letter, argued to constitute a violation of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, that the defendant sent to the plaintiffs in an effort to collect
the outstanding loans through a lawyer).
39. See id. at *2-*3 (summarizing the complicated procedural history in the case
whereby the borrowers sued the lenders for violations of several federal and state lending
and consumer fraud laws).
40. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
41. See discussion infra Part II.D-E.
42. See discussion infra Part III.
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As suggested by my earlier discussion of the benefits of contextual
analysis, the macro and micro levels of analysis together reveal a complex
interaction between formality and informality that is a significant source of
the exploitation of consumers of the small loans that constitute predatory
lending. Fundamentally, predatory lending transactions mix the advantages
of the informal and disadvantages of the formal in a particularly potent
way. These transactions harm the most vulnerable consumers, those who
are confined to or have been socialized in the ways of the cash economy.
In the final section, I will consider the notion of the democratization of
credit and suggest how the infusion of the positive values of informality
into the ideal of democratized credit might help curb predatory lending.43
Evidence exists that blacks and Latinos are disproportionately impacted
by predatory lending.44 Throughout the discussion that follows, I will note
the role that race and ethnicity play in the exploitation of debtors by
predatory lenders. Rather than focus directly on racism and ethnocentrism
or the legal rubrics that expressly address racial and ethnic discrimination, I
hope to isolate the more subtle mechanisms of bias and victimization by
concentrating on the interplay between formality and informality.
II. THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET AND INFORMALITY IN LENDING
A. Credit and the Social Safety Net
Informal small-sum lending has traditionally been a part of the social
safety net protecting individuals and families from poverty and financial
ruin. The social safety net consists of mechanisms aimed at mitigating the
adverse effects of the “free market” on economically marginalized
individuals or groups.45 The safety net in essence provides a degree of
security or protection against various life cycle contingencies (such as old
age, sickness, disability, or unemployment), unforeseen catastrophic events
(such as natural disasters or the premature death of a family’s principal
breadwinner), and the normal operations of a capitalist economy which
inevitably leave some citizens impoverished or in jeopardy of being
impoverished. Dislocations brought about by changes in the economy
and/or the regulatory environment such as we are presently experiencing
(outsourcing, growth of the low-wage service sector, escalating

43. See discussion infra Part IV.
44. See PETERSON, supra note 14, at 218 (stating that there exists “indisputable
evidence suggesting minorities with comparable education and income are nevertheless
disproportionately served by subprime mortgage lenders”).
45. See generally SOCIAL SAFETY NETS: ISSUES AND RECENT EXPERIENCES 7 & n.1 (Keyoung Chu & Sanjeev Gupta eds., 1998) (analyzing the purpose of social safety nets in
economic reform, particularly in the context of IMF reform packages).
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bankruptcies) may prompt a need for changes in the social safety net. Of
course, the safety net does more than protect economic well-being. The
self-respect and dignity of individuals, the stability of families, and the
cohesiveness of groups are undergirded by the floor of financial security
provided by the safety net.46
Credit is a component of the social safety net. People borrow small
sums for reasons that are related to the fulfillment of the safety net’s
goals.47 They use credit to enhance or maintain their productivity (e.g., to
start a business, invest in an education, or subsist until new employment is
found), to consume, and to provide a measure of income security or
insurance in times of enhanced risk.48 It is morally imperative that nearly
all citizens participate in the benefits of our consumer society at a certain
level. Access to credit assures access to basic necessities for debtors who,
because of un- or under-employment, lack an adequate income to pay for
essentials like food, shelter, and medicine.49 Beyond that, some minimal
notion of the good life supports borrowing for isolated, unexpected
emergencies or special occasions, like the illness of a family member or a
wedding,50 as well as cyclical borrowing, which occurs at Christmas time
or just before schools open in the fall, results when a family’s expenses
temporarily exceed revenues.51 Thus, consumer credit is significant not
just to “finance a consumer lifestyle” but also “to ease financial
hardship.”52 As a result of the role that credit plays in maintaining the
social safety net, affordability (by the class constrained) and the prevention
of discrimination (against racial and ethnic minorities and women) are
understandable priorities for credit regulators.53
B. The Informal Economy and the Social Safety Net
The social safety net is not limited to entities in the formal economy.
The mechanisms that compose the social safety net range from formal

46. See generally Ramsay, supra note 9, at 181, 192, 195 (discussing the distributive
values that should govern the regulation of consumer credit).
47. See MARY DALY & JIM WALSH, COMBAT POVERTY AGENCY, MONEYLENDING AND
LOW INCOME FAMILIES 90, 99-101 (1988) (describing a study that found that low-income
Irish borrowers depend on credit from door-to-door moneylenders for their most basic
needs).
48. See Timothy H. Nourse, The Missing Parts of Microfinance: Services for
Consumption and Insurance, 21 SAIS REV., Winter-Spring 2001, at 61, 64-65 (explaining
the interconnection between the various purposes for which consumers seek financial
services).
49. See Ramsay, supra note 9, at 177 (noting the use of credit in achieving mobility and
status, particularly in the context of race and gender).
50. DALY & WALSH, supra note 47, at 99.
51. Id.
52. Ramsay, supra note 9, at 180.
53. Id. at 181.

AUSTIN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1228

1/17/2005 11:17:48 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1217

programs administered by the government (such as Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families or TANF)54 to informal charity provided by private
individuals or community-based organizations. For the least well-off
consumers, the informal economy in general, with its informal practices
and procedures, forms a vital part of the social safety net.55 People with
limited skills, expertise, money, access to credit, or ties to wide-ranging
markets can survive in the informal economy when opportunities in the
formal economy are foreclosed to them.56 Informal modes of economic
activity tend to be small scale, local, face-to-face, and dependent upon
social relations or social capital.57 They also tend to involve limited
financial capital.58 Furthermore, informal modes of transacting tend to be
more malleable than formal modes of contracting. As a result, the informal
economy has a flexible, improvisational character that makes it responsive
to adverse economic circumstances and conditions.
In addition, the informal economy operates in the openings created by
the gap between law on the books and actual law enforcement.59 People
living on the margins and realistically assessing whether they can afford to
abide by every law exploit openings in the regulatory regime to create
informal economic opportunities for themselves.60 But as marginalized
consumers seek to gain an advantage by walking the line between the
formal and the informal, or the legal and the illegal or criminal, they also
subject themselves to heightened exploitation from the lack of regulatory
oversight of the informal actors with whom they deal. Thus, ordinary
consumers in the informal economy are always vulnerable to overreaching,
54. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 681-687 (2004).
55. See generally Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a
Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1789, 1803-06 (1992) [hereinafter Austin, The
Black Community] (describing generally a politics of identification with lawbreaking within
the black community, noting specifically the role of those individuals who bridge the gap
between the street “lawbreakers” and the black middle class by making everyday choices
about which laws to obey); Regina Austin, “An Honest Living”: Street Vendors, Municipal
Regulation, and the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 2119-20 (1994) [hereinafter
Austin, An Honest Living] (stating that lawbreaking in the form of informal economy
activity is the only means of economic survival for many poor blacks).
56. See Austin, An Honest Living, supra note 55, at 2123 (explaining how informal
black street vendors include sellers who are either foreclosed from or choose to opt out of
formal markets).
57. See discussion infra note 146.
58. Austin, The Black Community, supra note 55, at 1804.
59. See generally Jared N. Day, Credit, Capital and Community: Informal Banking in
Immigrant Communities in the United States, 1880-1924, 9 FIN. HIST. REV. 65, 70-72 (2002)
(describing how legislation failed to disrupt the overall structure of “padrones,” a complex
system of immigrant banking within the Greek and Italian communities in New York at the
turn of the century); Ivan Light, Numbers Gambling Among Blacks: A Financial Institution,
42 AM. SOC. REV. 892, 897 (1977) (explaining how the numbers racket was a method for
individuals to “invest” small sums for a potentially large reward and a source of credit for
individuals and businesses).
60. Austin, The Black Community, supra note 55, at 1769.
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incompetence, and economic instability. Moreover, the informal economy
works best where formal firms fail or fear to tread. Thus financial firms in
the formal sector are always on the lookout for opportunities to make a
profit by moving into or absorbing areas of the informal economy that have
proven to be lucrative. The formal actors will move into the sector and
force the informal actors out of business. Without prior notice, regulatory
loopholes can be closed, strict formality demanded, and customers caught
on the wrong side of the line may be left without recourse.
The workings of the informal economy are by their very nature
circumspect and partially or completely hidden from the view of outsiders.
As a result, it is difficult to track its dealings, measure its scope, and
definitively assess who comes out ahead at the end of the day.
C. Informality of Form Versus Informality in Mode of Transacting
By providing credit outside of formal markets via informal transactions,
informal lenders are part of the social safety net twice over. They are
loosely organized and operate on a small scale.61 They may specialize or
cater to a discrete niche of the loan market.62 They are physically and
socially accessible, lend very small amounts of money, employ fairly
simple and transparent procedures, and process requests or applications for
loans rapidly.63 Informal lenders tend to exploit “[c]ost advantages in
information gathering” and “to utilize more effective enforcement
mechanisms.”64 Of course, intimidation and harassment come to mind
when informal lenders are mentioned. The flexibility of informal lending
allows the lenders “to reach borrowers beyond the profitable reach of the
formal sector, and to reduce transaction costs usually below those in the
formal sector.”65 Most importantly, informal lenders operate beyond the
reach of legal regulations, particularly those placing ceilings on interest
rates, mandating disclosure of terms to borrowers, and limiting debt
collection practices.66 The possibility of sharp practice and abuse inheres
in informal lending, but this varies with the character of the informal
lender.
Formal lenders, by contrast, tend to operate on a larger scale; “the
transactions are usually arms-length, and loan terms more standardized,”

61. PRABHU GHATE, THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, INFORMAL FINANCE: SOME
FINDINGS FROM ASIA 6 (1992).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Sherrie L.W. Rhine & Maude Toussant-Comeau, The Use of Formal and Informal
Financial Markets Among Black Households, 45 CONSUMER INT. ANN. 146, 146 (1999).
65. GHATE, supra note 61, at 6-7.
66. Id.
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generally being reduced to writing.67 In many cases, formal lenders are
subject to a panoply of regulations that theoretically protect borrowers, but
allow the creditor to make a profit on the transaction.68
Formality and informality do not merely describe the way in which a
lending entity is structured; they may also characterize the mode or style of
transacting in which the entity engages. In terms of methods of doing
business, “[i]nformality is characterized by highly personalized loan
transactions entailing face-to-face dealings with borrowers and flexibility
in respect of loan purpose, interest rates, collateral requirements, maturity
periods, and debt rescheduling.”69 A formally structured lender may
employ informal lending practices. Consider the ABC Loan Co., a blackowned pawnshop located in South Central Los Angeles, which was profiled
in a 1995 documentary “No Loans Today” directed by Lisanne Skylar.70
ABC’s best customers were those who fell short at the end of every
month.71 They would pawn their valuables until they received their
paychecks or benefits checks, which they would cash at ABC for a one
percent fee.72 Although regulated and subject to the oversight of the police
department’s pawn detail, ABC operated on an informal basis.73 Loans
were limited to $25.74 For persons without traditional identification,
alternative sources, such as a traffic ticket signed in front of an officer,
would suffice. When a customer tried to pawn an item of personal
significance, but of little intrinsic value, the clerk could point to a sign
indicating “No Loans Today” so as to avoid insulting the customer.75 The
customer was left with a bit of hope and dignity.
For the consumer seeking a loan, the choice is not an absolute one
between formality and informality, but rather one of choosing the option
that offers the best mix of the advantages of both. Consider the qualities
consumers might want from a provider of financial services:
. . . reliability, trustworthiness, flexible hours, outreach, physical and
cultural accessibility, provision of a range of financial services, speedy
procedures, understanding of clients’ businesses and the ability to
communicate with the clients. More specifically, for credit, clients also
want discretion, transparency, seasonally sensitive products and terms,
timeliness, procedures tailored to clients’ needs, fair interest rates,

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 6.
NO LOANS TODAY: SOUTH CENTRAL LOS ANGELES (First Run/Icarus Films 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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money available at short notice, sufficient capital for clients’ needs and
[the option of] repayment in cash or kind . . .76

From the borrower’s point of view there are numerous advantages
generally associated with informal lending (flexible terms, geographical
accessibility, and rapid approval), but there are also disadvantages (limited
range of services, insufficient capital, and high interest rates) that formality
cures. At the same time, the disadvantages of formality (longer approval
processes, collateral requirements, lack of transparency, and
inhospitableness) may be remedied by a bit of informality. Of course, not
every consumer would make the same tradeoff between the benefits of
formality and the advantages of informality.
D. The Lower Income Consumer and the Continuum of Choices
The options of a lower income consumer short on money to meet current
obligations can be grouped into roughly three categories: savings-like
credit, external sources of credit, and do-it-yourself credit creation. The
options will be discussed in order of their declining advantage to the
consumer.
1.

Savings-like credit
Most people confronted with financial difficulties resort to their own
savings first, if they have any.77 Their funds may be located in formal
institutions like banks or credit unions and take the form of formal timedeposit savings or money market accounts, certificates of deposit, or
savings bonds.78 Alternatively, their savings may be “invested” in informal
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) or savings clubs.
A ROSCA is a club or a collective of participants who make
contributions, generally monetary, on a periodic basis to a common fund
which is distributed in whole or in part to each contributor on a rotating
basis until everyone has collected.79 Participation in a ROSCA requires a

76. See J. Howard M. Jones & Owuraka Sakyi-Dawson, Linking Formal and Informal
Financial Intermediaries in Ghana: A Way To Increase Women’s Access to Financial
Services?, in WOMEN AND CREDIT: RESEARCHING THE PAST, REFIGURING THE FUTURE 271,
278 (Beverly Lemire et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter WOMEN AND CREDIT].
77. See E. THOMAS GARMAN & RAYMOND E. FORGUE, PERSONAL FINANCE 126 (6th ed.
2000) (suggesting that maintaining a savings account can allow flexibility in times of
financial hardship).
78. Id. at 125.
79. Shirley Ardener, Women Making Money Go Round: ROSCAs Revisited, in MONEYGO-ROUNDS: THE IMPORTANCE OF ROTATING SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS FOR
WOMEN 1 (Shirley Ardener & Sandra Burman eds., 1995). A participant receives as much
from the fund as they contribute over the life of the ROSCA. ROSCAs are part credit union
(particularly for those who draw their share early in the process), part savings club
(particularly for those whose turn comes toward the end), and part insurance scheme
(particularly for those who have emergencies and are allowed to collect out of turn). Louis
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regular income and social capital.80 ROSCAs operate on trust and peer
pressure to insure that the necessary sums will be saved by the members
and paid into the common fund on a timely basis.81 Some participants need
the social coercion of a ROSCA obligation to save, and ROSCAs make
saving easier.82 There is little paperwork or documentation to fill out. The
payback is relatively quick. Most ROSCAs are short-lived, though a new
round of collective saving may start as soon as one ends. The operations
tend to be local or community-based and therefore close to home or work;
some ROSCAs even extend the benefit of a traveling banker who visits
participants for the purpose of collecting and paying out funds. ROSCAs
also supply the economic benefits that can flow from social capital:
financial information, advice, and economic opportunities to exploit.83 The
early takers from the common pot get a bit of credit in the process, while
the late takers are essentially creditors who receive no interest. In addition,
the credit ROSCAs extend is only for relatively short terms.84 The biggest
disadvantage of ROSCAs is that the organizers and participants may be
untrustworthy and put the savings of the more reliable parties in jeopardy.
That is why some ROSCAs allocate the pot based on trustworthiness (with
the least reliable going last), as opposed to need, luck (as where the order is
determined by lottery), or bidding (as where the pot goes to the participant
who offers to make the highest contribution to the pot in the future).85
By contrast, a savings club pools its members’ savings in a common
bank account and makes emergency loans to members in need or funds
those wishing to finance micro-enterprises.86 Savings clubs require less in
Sterling, Partners: The Social Organization of Rotating Savings and Credit Societies
Among Exilic Jamaicans, 29 SOC. 653, 657 (1995) (describing the practices of ROSCAs
known as “partners” formed by Jamaican immigrants in Manchester, England). See also
KELLEE S. TSAI, BACK-ALLEY BANKING: PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS IN CHINA 77-78, 104-17
(2002) (describing the operation of Chinese ROSCAs, called “huis,” that were initiated by
the women left behind to pay the costs of the immigration of their male relatives to
America); Eda Hastick, Susus: New Life for a Caribbean Grassroots Approach to Savings,
WADABAGEI: A JOURNAL OF THE CARIBBEAN AND ITS DIASPORA, Summer/Fall 1998, at 121,
123-26 (describing the practices of ROSCAs known as “susus,” formed by Caribbean
immigrants in the United States). Such associations, which are common throughout Africa,
Asia, and the Caribbean and known by various names, have been formed in this country by
members of immigrant groups, but are rare among indigenous blacks or other native-born
poor and working class groups. Id.
80. Hastick, supra note 79, at 125, 126-27.
81. Sterling, supra note 79, at 662-63.
82. Hastick, supra note 79, at 128-29.
83. Ardener, supra note 79, at 9.
84. See generally Jones & Sakyi-Dawson, supra note 76, at 277 (listing a short term of
less than month characteristic of advances made by collectors of informal Ghanaian
ROSCAs known as “susus”).
85. Ardener, supra note 79, at 9.
86. See generally Ivan Light, Self-Help for the Urban Poor, AM. ENT. ONLINE, JulyAug. 1996 (arguing that non-immigrant low-income communities would benefit from
savings arrangements similar to ROSCAs), at http://www.taemag.com/issues/issue
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the way of social capital and earnings and are therefore more suited to
lower-income participants, like mothers receiving assistance from the state.
Unfortunately, non-immigrant, low-income Americans have no tradition
of forming ROSCAs or savings clubs as alternatives to dealing with formal
financial institutions.87 The poor who would benefit most from such
informal associations particularly lack the shared trust and solidarity that
make such informal associations possible.
2.

External sources of credit
If a debtor lacks savings and needs credit, she or he may be able to
obtain a loan from a mainstream, formal institution like a bank, credit
union, consumer finance company, or sales finance company, such as
General Motors Acceptance Corporation or GMAC. These sources,
however, are most readily available to borrowers who have preexisting
relationships with the entities or good credit records.88
Alternatively, credit cards, which are generally issued by banks, also
enable debtors to deal with financial emergencies and unexpected or
uncontrollable changes in income or expenditures. Access to credit cards is
widening, and lower income Americans increasingly have credit cards.89 In
fact, they are the fastest growing group of credit card holders in the
country.90 Credit cards provide borrowers with a measure of flexibility in
that borrowers have some choice with regard to the amount of the loan and
the rate of repayment.91 Moreover, credit cards do not restrict where the
borrowed funds are spent and may even allow the card holder to borrow
cash.
Statistical evidence suggests that poorer credit card holders use their
cards as a form of “consumption insurance.”92 They maintain higher
ID.116/toc.asp (on file with the American University Law Review); Sterling, supra note 79,
at 121 (describing how Jamaican “partners” savings clubs allow members the flexibility of
withdrawing funds for unforeseen reasons).
87. See generally Light, supra note 86.
88. See GARMAN & FORGUE, supra note 77, at 187-89 (indicating that, in addition to
making loans to customers with good credit records, depository institutions further reduce
their risk by requiring collateral or a cosigner).
89. See generally Edward J. Bird et al., Credit Card Debt of the Poor: High and
Rising, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 125 (1999) (speculating on the impact that the
poor’s credit card debt might have in the event of an economic downturn).
90. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT
24 (2000) (suggesting that credit card issuers see those with low incomes as attractive
customers).
91. See EDWARD BIRD ET AL., INST. FOR RES. ON POVERTY, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 114897, CREDIT CARDS AND THE POOR 1 (1997), at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/pubs
/dp114897.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
92. See id. at 8-9, 11, 20 (noting that, in contrast to the “near-poor and the poor,” those
in higher income groups use their credit cards as a “payment vehicle”). During a recession,
higher income households use their credit cards less while lower income households do the
opposite. Id. at 9.
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balances during recessions to smooth the decline in their consumption,
dictated by their worsening economic condition, and pay down their
balances as well as secure more cards during economic upturns.93
Interviews conducted in a predominately Latino community in Chicago
found that the residents used credit cards as a device for maintaining
consumption levels in periods of financial difficulty. This occurred when
their incomes declined due to death, illness, or unemployment or when
their expenditures climbed due to an increase in living expenses or in the
number of dependents.94 Credit card companies find lower income
borrowers attractive because their lower creditworthiness justifies charging
them higher interest rates and their greater tendency to miss or make late
payments generates more fees. The fees charged for merely processing
applications for secured credit cards (which offer credit limits equal to the
balance in linked savings accounts) are especially high; secured cards
extend credit to holders who pose especially high risks.95
Subprime lenders represent a third type of formal external source of
credit, albeit one in which informal modes of transacting are used.
Predatory lending will be discussed more fully below.96
Some debtors are able to tap informal external sources that offer credit
on very flexible terms. Family, friends, acquaintances, neighbors, and coworkers are typical sources of short-term loans and, in some cases, even
gifts.97 Small local merchants or shopkeepers also extend informal credit to
customers whom they know.98 Loans from these sources tend to be
informal in that there is usually no written note or contract, the terms of
repayment are not typically specified, and little or no interest is charged.99
93. See id. (noting that while poor households use the economic booms to pay off their
debts, non-poor households expand their debt during the same period).
94. See PHILIP BOND & ROBERT TOWNSEND, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, ECON.
PERSP., FORMAL AND INFORMAL FINANCING IN A CHICAGO ETHNIC NEIGHBORHOOD 3, 4, 7 n.2
(1996) (reporting results of a survey of a predominately Latino community regarding the use
and
sources
of
credit),
at
http://www.chicafed.org/publications/
economicperspectives/1996/epjul96.pdf (on file with the American University Law
Review).
95. See GARMAN & FORGUE, supra note 77, at 164 (describing how secured credit card
issuers advertise via “‘900’ telephone numbers” where the caller is charged a fee for the call
and then charged an additional nonrefundable fee to process the application).
96. See discussion infra Part II.E (describing payday loans as a combination of formal
and informal means of financing).
97. See Julia R. Henly, Informal Support Networks and the Maintenance of Low-Wage
Jobs, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LOW-WAGE
WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 179, 182-83 (Frank Munger ed., 2002)
(noting that the assistance received from informal support networks varies with the income
level of members).
98. See GHATE, supra note 61, at 33 (indicating that “consumption credit” granted by
small stores is widely common).
99. See id. at 25 (suggesting that credit extended among friends and relatives may not
always be interest free). A further feature of this type of loan is often an “unwritten”
reciprocity obligation. Id. There is an implicit assumption by the lender that the borrower
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The “creditworthiness” of the borrower is a matter of the lender’s personal
knowledge and judgment.100 Of course, the amounts lent are generally
small because the pool of funds available is limited to the personal assets of
the informal creditors.101 Trust and affinity provide some guarantee that
the loan will be repaid. The repayment may consist of the fulfillment of a
reciprocal obligation of assistance in a time of need.102 The biggest
drawback to relying on personal connections for credit is that the lender is
more likely to be inquisitive about the borrower’s need for the loan.
Privacy, confidentiality, anonymity, and freedom from embarrassment are
not assured when borrowing through one’s social network.
For people who are socially and economically attenuated or isolated
from friends and relations, or who come from backgrounds devoid of deep
pockets, the option of obtaining such informal credit may be restricted.103
The amount of support a social network provides tends to vary with race
and ethnicity.104 Minority social networks are generally less financially
able to provide assistance than white social networks because of the
intergenerational impact of racial and ethnic discrimination.105 For
example, research has shown that the amounts and kinds of
intergenerational support children receive typically depend on the
socioeconomic and class status of their parents.106 “[I]nteractions among
markets amplify discrimination in any one market into others,” while
“personal discrimination in one period turns into structural discrimination
in the next period.”107
Thus, the discrimination minority parents
experienced in the labor market impacted their experiences in the housing

will return the favor “should their fortunes be reversed.” Id.
100. See id. at 6 (describing that the small scale of informal lenders is based on the fact
that lending is generally based upon “personal knowledge of the borrower”).
101. See id. at 23 (noting that intermittent lenders, like friends and family, make direct
loans to debtors with their temporary surplus funds).
102. See Henly, supra note 97, at 184 (describing that repayment may be immediate in
less intimate networks whereas the opposite is true for support networks with closer ties
among the members).
103. See BOND & TOWNSEND, supra note 94, at 9-11 (reporting that the lower income
residents of a Chicago Hispanic community who lacked proficiency in English tended to
rely on friends more than those who were relatively well-off and who had a command of
English).
104. See Henly, supra note 97, at 182-83 (noting that not just the amount but also the
kind of support will vary due to the socioeconomic make-up of the social network).
105. Id.
106. See Anne Francis-Okongwu, Looking up from the Bottom to the Ceiling of the
Basement Floor: Female Single-Parent Families Surviving on $20,000 or Less a Year, 24
URB. ANTHROPOLOGY 313, 338-39, 340-44 (attributing racial differences in the network
support and housing accommodations received by single mothers to the class and
socioeconomic status of their parents).
107. Gary A. Dymski, Why Does Race Matter in Housing and Credit Markets? Current
Research and Future Directions, in RACE, MARKETS, AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES 157, 184
(Patrick L. Mason & Rhonda M. Williams eds., 1997).
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market and vice versa.108 The parents’ experiences in those markets in turn
not only impact their ability to provide money or housing assistance to their
offspring, but also figure in the determination of the socioeconomic or class
status of their offspring and the likelihood that the latter will need social
support from their families.
Individuals are not the only potential lenders motivated by affinity or
empathy. A number of organizations and institutions offer their members
or individuals in the communities they serve a way out of difficult
economic situations on a nonprofit basis that will not compromise the
borrowers’ financial futures. As contributors to the social safety net, local
nonprofit organizations,109 including churches and mosques,110 engage in
small-sum lending and charitable giving.111 In lieu of cash, these entities
sometimes provide in-kind assistance such as prescription medicines or
emergency car repairs.112
The not-for-profit sector might be considered distinct from and a buffer
between the formal and informal sectors. Like actors in the informal
economy, not-for-profits may be motivated by altruism, moral or religious
commitment, or the desire to enjoy the benefits of reciprocal exchanges of
obligation and respect. On the other hand, the lending activities of these
organizations may be as self-interested and manipulative as any forprofit’s. Surely, religiously-affiliated organizations lend as an adjunct to
their spiritual proselytizing. Nonprofits sustain themselves by seeking
“symbolic capital,” i.e., honor and prestige which creates a debt on the part
of the recipients that when called upon will generate material gain.
Symbolic capital entitles nonprofit concerns to raise funds by proclaiming
their past “good works.”113 Moreover, the credit provided by charitable

108. See id. (describing that the result on the housing market appears in lower appraisals,
residential segregation, and economic inequality).
109. LOCAL INDEP. CHARITIES OF AM., ABOUT US, at http://www.lic.org (last visited on
Sept. 17, 2004) (providing a searchable database of more than six hundred local charities)
(on file with the American University Law Review).
110. MUSLIM CMTY. SUPPORT SERVS., INC., ABOUT MCSS, at http://www.
muslimsupport.org/index.html (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) (describing the organization
begun in 1999 as a support system for Muslim families in the New England area that
provides for both financial and social services support based on the responsibilities dictated
in the Muslim faith) (on file with the American University Law Review).
111. See infra notes 115-20 (providing a number of examples of the type of assistance
contributors to the social safety net provide).
112. AM. RED CROSS, COMMUNITY SERVICES, at http://www.redcross.org/more
/commserv (last visited on Sept. 17, 2004) (listing a variety of non-monetary services the
organization offers including home delivery of meals and transportation to medical
appointments) (on file with the American University Law Review).
113. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 112-20 (Richard Nice
trans. 1990); Carolyn Betensky, The Prestige of the Oppressed: Symbolic Capital in a Guilt
Economy, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: FIELD WORK IN CULTURE 207, 208 (Nicholas Brown & Imre
Szeman eds., 2000).
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sources does not necessarily satisfy the needs of the recipient as to the
amount of the loan, the terms, or the timing.114
Many local utility companies offer assistance in the form of balanced
payment options, deferred payment plans, and outright grants to help
customers maintain service in times of financial hardship.115 Municipalities
may also extend emergency assistance to individuals and families already
receiving government assistance.
In addition, some employers (including universities116 and
municipalities117) offer emergency grants to employees as a kind of fringe
benefit. The programs are usually administered through the employers’
human resources departments.
When an employer provides such
assistance, it perhaps should not be viewed as charity or disinterested
largesse; rather it may indicate that the employer is not paying its
employees an adequate wage. That is very likely true with regard to the
military. Each branch of the armed forces has its own emergency
assistance program which provides such services as emergency loans,
education assistance, and community enhancement programs.118 As of
114. Cf. PETER K. EISINGER, TOWARD AN END TO HUNGER IN AMERICA 120 (1998)
(describing the limitations of the charitable provision of food to the hungry).
115. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HELP WITH YOUR UTILITY BILLS, at
http://www.hud.gov.local/id/renting/energyprgms.cfm (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004); PAC.
GAS
AND
ELEC.
CO.,
FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS,
at
www.pge.com/res/financial_assistance (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) (outlining the
availability of a number of programs that allow for low-income residents and others to
receive financial assistance through Pacific Gas and Electric including Family Electric Rate
Assistance (FERA), Relief for Energy Assistance through Community Help (REACH), as
well as balanced payment plans) (on file with the American University Law Review);
LEAVENWORTH COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE AM. RED CROSS, UTILITY ASSISTANCE, at
http://leavenworthcounty.redcross.org/utility.htm (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) (showing
that these resources are available even in non-urban settings within the United States
through a number of means including the American Red Cross) (on file with the American
University Law Review).
116. UNIV. OF ALA. AT BIRMINGHAM, UAB FACULTY AND STAFF BENEVOLENT FUND:
EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, at http://main.uab.edu/show.asp?
durki’25309 (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004) (describing the objective of the Employee
Emergency Assistance Program and outlining the operation of the program) (on file with the
American University Law Review); CORNELL UNIV., EMERGENCY GRANT FUND, at
http://www.assembly.cornell.edu/EA/EGF.html 2001 (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004)
(explaining the Emergency Grant Fund as a confidential service and listing the criteria for
eligibility) (on file with the American University Law Review).
117. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, DENVER EMPLOYEES EMERGENCY PROGRAM: ABOUT
US, at http://www.denvergov.org/deep/1794aboutus.asp (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004)
(outlining a program that offers grants to city and county employees requiring financial
assistance and asserting that the grants need not be repaid because they are funded by
employee donations) (on file with the American University Law Review); CITY OF WICHITA,
BYLAWS OF THE CITY OF WICHITA EMPLOYEES’ EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FUND, at
http://www.wichitagov.org/NR/rdonlyres/E1209A44-0B1F-468E-A030-77A41BE9D091/0/
Employee_Emergency_Assistance_Fund_Bylaws_15d.pdf (last visited on Sept. 7, 2004)
(authorizing the fund to provide financial assistance to city employees in need) (on file with
the American University Law Review).
118. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, MILITARY LOANS FROM PAYDAY LENDERS, at
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January 2004, the Air Force Aid Society operated close to fifteen separate
programs and offered $760,000 in grants and over $12 million in interest
free loans.119 The Army’s program, which started in 1942, provides for
emergency financial assistance to both active duty and retired soldiers
based on demonstrable need.120 The armed forces have also responded
directly to the problem posed by payday lenders located near military
facilities.121 Because payday lenders use the post-dated checks given to
them to support criminal prosecutions against the borrowers as a form of
debt collection, the military has found itself in a position of losing troops
caught in the payday loan cycle.122 Military leaders have supported
legislation regulating payday lenders or declared such lenders off limits to
military personnel.123
If their personal network of informal lenders is nonexistent, tapped dry,
or incapable of supplying sufficient funds, borrowers may be forced to
resort to less savory alternatives, such as moneylenders or true loan sharks
with criminal connections who operate on the wrong side of the law. The
best available information suggests that moneylenders or loan sharks are
most likely to be found in immigrant communities.124 The interest charged
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday/military2.cfm (last visited on Sept. 8, 2004)
(presenting the alternatives to payday lending and loan sharking that are exclusive to the
military especially including the Army Emergency Relief Fund, the Air Force Aid Society,
the Navy Marine Corps Relief Society and Coast Guard Mutual Assistance as well as small
loans available through private companies) (on file with the American University Law
Review).
119. AIR FORCE AID SOC’Y, AFAS GUIDE FOR ASSISTANCE, at http://www.afas.org (last
visited on Sept. 7, 2004) (documenting the many programs offered through the aid society
for the year of 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).
120. ARMY EMERGENCY RELIEF, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2003) (showing that Army
Emergency Relief assisted a total of 53,865 individuals in 2003 with a total of assistance of
$37,381,251 awarded), available at http://www.aerhq.org/AnnualReport2003.
121. Paul Fain, The Few, the Proud, the Indebted, MOTHER JONES, May/June 2004, at 19,
19 (describing how these lending institutions are mixed in with the shops and restaurants
right outside military bases); see also Russ Bynum, Army Launches Offensive Against
Lenders, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2003, at A5 (suggesting that, outside of military bases, the
signs of payday lenders and check cashing establishments are as “ubiquitous as golden
arches”).
122. Rhonda Cook, Misery at High Interest: Military Wants War on Payday Loans,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 4, 2003, at A1 (indicating that members of the military may be
subject to court-martial should they not honor their debts); see also Bynum, supra note 121,
at A1 (asserting that military personnel who do not pay their debt may lose their security
clearances).
123. See Fain, supra note 121, at 19 (noting that the Judge Advocate General’s Corps
declared a payday lender “off-limits to military personnel”). A Navy Captain also testified
before Georgia legislators “in favor of a bill imposing tough new penalties against payday
lenders.” Id. See also Diana B. Henriques, Seeking Quick Loans, Soldiers Race into HighInterest Traps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at A1, C3 (describing possible protection from a
proposal for a federal cap on post-enlistment debt interest rates and a trade association
military code of best practices).
124. See Dexter Filkins, In Some Immigrant Enclaves, Loan Shark Is the Local Bank,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at A1 (describing activities of Latino “prestamistas” in the
Washington Heights section of New York City); see also Juleyka Lantigua, The Progressive
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by such informal lenders may be quite high, the amount available for
lending may be limited in time and duration, and the operation may be so
localized that the lender is unable to spread the risk.125 Their collection
methods are more likely to be violent when compared to those of other
informal lenders.126
3.

Do-it-yourself credit creation
Finally, there are informal mechanisms that ordinary consumers employ
to create a bit of credit for themselves when they are unable to draw on
personal savings or to obtain a loan from an external source. Some of these
measures are close to, if not over, the line of illegality. Figuratively,
“robbing Peter to pay Paul” is a common maneuver among the cashstrapped. They juggle bills by paying one creditor and holding off the
others or by taking funds earmarked to satisfy one account and using them
to settle some other obligation. Thus, the rent may get paid first, while the
phone company and the utility company are given the lowest priority.127 A
debtor may also write a check hoping that it will not clear before additional
funds can be put in the bank account.128 Sometimes a merchant or vendor
will take a postdated check in satisfaction of an obligation.129 The

Media Project: Loan Sharks Prey on Immigrants, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER, July 7, 2001,
at A7 (suggesting that consumers turn to moneylenders because of the absence of formal
banks in the consumers’ underserved community). It is not uncommon for immigrants to
finance their passage to America by borrowing from moneylenders who operate here and
abroad. See Peter Kwong, Poverty Despite Family Ties, in THE NEW POVERTY STUDIES:
THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF POWER, POLITICS, AND IMPOVERISHED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES
57, 62-67 (Judith Goode & Jeff Maskovsky eds., 2001).
125. See Filkins, supra note 124, at A1 (stating that the interest on loans from loan
sharks accrues at “punishing” and “illegal rates”). Furthermore, some loan sharks severely
limit the amount one can borrow. Id. One “prestamista” stated in an interview that he does
not lend more than three-thousand dollars to any one client. Id.
126. See id. (describing that the collection methods of these informal lenders include
threats and forceful collection of collateral).
127. Karen Seccombe, “SO YOU THINK I DRIVE A CADILLAC?” WELFARE RECIPIENTS’
PERSPECTIVES ON THE SYSTEM AND ITS REFORM 114-16 (1999).
128. The amount of time it takes for a check to clear may be substantially reduced from a
matter of days to a matter of hours or minutes because of the Check Clearing for the 21st
Century Act, known colloquially as the “Check 21 Act.” See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5001 (2003).
The Act authorizes the electronic processing of substitute checks, which obviates the delays
caused by the necessity of physical transporting the originals between banks. The result of
Check 21 is likely to be more bounced checks and more overdraft charges for consumers
counting on the float to give them time to deal with a cash shortage. See Jennifer A.
Kingston, Float Time on Check Shortens, as of Today, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at C1;
Kathy Louise Schuit, Personal Checks Won’t Float for Long under New Rules,
ALBUQUERQUE (N.M.) J., at A5. Other customers are likely to be burned as well since the
law does not require that banks post customers’ deposits more expeditiously. See Check
This Out, N.Y. TIMES, OCT. 31, 2004, § 4, at 10 (criticizing the lack of consumer protection
in the law promoting the electronic processing of checks and calling for a no-hold policy
regarding checks deposited by customers without a history of problems).
129. See GHATE, supra note 61, at 33 (describing the importance of the postdated check
in obtaining trade credit).
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“robbery” becomes more literal when the check writer knows that there are
insufficient funds in her or his account to cover the amount, but writes a
check anyway with the design of paying both the amount of the check and
any fees the creditor and the bank might charge for handling an insufficient
funds draft. Lacking explicit overdraft protection, the customers thereby
informally create the equivalent form of credit for themselves. This
practice places the check writer at risk of being prosecuted, sued for fraud,
or blacklisted by mainstream financial institutions.130 However, the fees
charged by banks for providing bounce protection represent a source of
significant profit.131 Banks have moved into the vacuum created by the
informal practice and are extending overdraft protection on a
“discretionary” basis without prior notice to customers of the substantial
fees or implicit interest being charged.132
Some informal measures to generate credit, however, are illegal. Checkkiting, of which the defendant accused the plaintiffs in Short Term
Loans,133 is an illegal activity. It involves drawing on funds credited to an
account before the funds have actually been collected.134 “By writing
checks drawn on two or more out-of-town banks, a person temporarily
short of cash can write an interest-free unauthorized bank loan or
temporarily inflate his account balance to improve his chances of getting a
loan.”135

130. See Blackford v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 537, 540-44 (S.D. Ga. 1996)
(denying a claim for malicious prosecution brought by a customer who was arrested even
though she had covered the bounced check with a money order because she had made a
practice of paying for merchandise with bad checks); see also Paul Beckett, It’s Not in the
Mail: Bounce a Check, and You Might Not Write Another for 5 Years, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1,
2000, at A1 (describing the punitive impact on low-income consumers of banks’ reliance on
the ChexSystems database); Katie Fairbank, Critics Say ChexSystems Errors Hurt
Consumers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 16, 2000, at 1D (outlining the criticism of the
ChexSystems database, noting that it includes only negative information and hurts innocent
consumers improperly listed and those guilty of only minor infractions). The ChexSystems
database collects information on customers who have bounced checks. Beckett, supra, at
A1.
131. See Owen B. Asplundh, Bounce Protection: Payday Lending in Sheep’s Clothing?,
8 N.C. BANKING INST. 349, 353 (2004) (indicating that the banking industry profits an
estimated $31 billion from overdraft service fees).
132. See id. at 356-57 (comparing bounce protection to payday lending with regard to
compliance with the Truth in Lending Act, state usury caps, and unfair and deceptive trade
practices laws).
133. Smith v. Short Term Loans, L.L.C., No. 99-C1288, 2001 WL 127303, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 14, 2001).
134. FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, AN OVERVIEW OF CHECK KITING, at
http://www.chicafed.org/banking_information/check_kiting.cfm (last visited on Sept. 17,
2004) (citing check kiting as “one of the most common” examples of fraud perpetrated by
bank customers) (on file with the American University Law Review).
135. THOMAS P. FITCH, DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 87 (3d ed. 1997).

AUSTIN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

1/17/2005 11:17:48 AM

PREDATORY LENDING AND CREDIT DEMOCRATIZATION

1241

E. Subprime Lending as a Combination of the Formal and Informal
The formal subprime or alternative sector covers a part of the market for
small personal loans that firms in the primary sector, at one time, did not
want and left to informal lenders. Now formal financial institutions are
buying into or building partnerships with subprime lenders to take
advantage of the latter’s tremendous profitability.136 To extract profits
from small-sum loans, payday lenders and other subprime firms combine
elements of formal lending (standardized contracts, formal fixed locations,
and resort to legal remedies in the event of default) with elements of
informal lending (frequent face-to-face transactions, high interests rates for
short-term loans, and quick approvals) and do-it-yourself credit creation
(juggling money between several accounts, and writing post-dated
checks).137 Subprime lenders are able to make a profit in a sector long
neglected by formal firms because subprimes use relatively cheap but
powerful computerized credit scoring to determine the creditworthiness of
their borrowers.138 Moreover, the loans generated are bundled into
securities and permit the lenders to spread the risk of default.139
Though subprime lenders claim that their products represent a
democratization of the formal credit market, their activities might also be
viewed as a commercialization of what was formerly socially-supported,
local assistance. The expansion of formal firms into the informal market
for small-sum loans suggests that some of the benefits of informal smallsum lending and charity may be in jeopardy. From this perspective, the
firms of the subprime sector are more efficient at parting customers from
their money than informal lenders because of the subprime entities’ more
open and aggressive marketing practices and their greater legitimacy to
customers who would be reluctant to conduct business with some informal
suppliers of credit. At the same time, subprime lenders employ informal
modes of transacting that lull consumers into thinking that the lenders’
terms and practices are more benign than they turn out to be.140
136. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 4 n.14 (describing how banks and payday lenders are
partnering to take advantage of loopholes in the federal law regulating the banking
industry). Banks are “so eager for fee income” that they allow the payday lenders to
effectively rent their charters. Id.
137. See generally id. (describing how payday lenders disguise the transactions with
their customers by using a variety of “sham transactions” including fake leasing
arrangements and purchases).
138. See id. at 61 (noting that the use of a credit reporting agency by payday lenders is
surprising because many of these businesses advertise to the contrary). The majority of
payday lenders use Tele-Track, a credit reporting agency that focuses on the subprime
clientele the lenders seek out. Id. at 61 n.306.
139. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Predatory
Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1577 (2002) (indicating how banks support subprime
lenders through purchasing securities backed by such institutions’ loans).
140. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 25, 26, 31-33 (criticizing payday lenders for hiding
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Without effective regulation, formal lenders may not take the important
social safety net function of small-sum lending into account. For example,
distributive justice and anti-discrimination are not as likely to be important
to commercial firms engaged in extending commercial lending into the
lowest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder as they might be to nonprofit
community-based lenders. Regulation is particularly important to protect
the poor and near-poor who have trouble meeting their debt service
obligations, but stand to lose the little wealth they have accumulated
through the machinations of a predatory credit market.
It may appear that all victims of predatory lending would benefit from
greater formality imposed through regulation. There is a tendency to
associate formal institutions and formal transacting with more fairness and
less exploitation. The light shed on business dealings in the formal, “above
ground” economy theoretically fosters competition. Moreover, legal
regulation constrains overreaching, and mandates disclosures, both of
which increase the likelihood of transactions that mimic those truly savvy
consumers would enter into. But the sort of fairness that competition and
regulation would produce may not be compatible with the needs or
preferences of every consumer in the market for a small loan.
The focus thus far has been on the relative advantages and disadvantages
of formal and informal lenders and modes of lending. Yet to be addressed
are the values and preferences customers bring to credit transactions. The
choices that consumers actually make from the panoply of credit
alternatives laid out above are, by and large, constrained ones. The
borrowers’ material circumstances and their access to potential lenders play
a significant role in the selection, as does the borrowers’ socialization and
cultural orientation regarding money and personal finance.141 Material
constraints, of course, tend to shape borrowers’ financial habits. However,
consumers familiar with or having a preference for informal modes of
transacting would seem to be prime targets for firms operating in the
subprime market. This is not a coincidence.
Informal ways of dealing with money are not exclusively an aspect of
the informal or underground economy; they are also part and parcel of the
legitimate cash economy which possesses a measure of visibility. Cashbasis borrowers and those socialized in the ways of the cash economy bring
to transactions with subprime sector lenders a set of financial practices,

basic information about their services from their clients). The lenders make it simple and
quick for consumers to borrow through them but give false and misleading information
about the cost of the loan and the credit checking procedures used to approve the consumer
for the loan. Id. at 25-26.
141. See Rhine & Toussant-Comeau, supra note 64, at 149 (describing the use of
alternative financial services by households of different socioeconomic classifications).
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preferences, and perceptions that favor informality in commercial
transactions.142 Unfortunately, they also reduce the consumers’ vigilance
with regard to exploitation and overreaching. The cash economy generates
a distrust of formal primary sector financial institutions and promotes an
emphasis on the social nature of commercial transactions.143 Furthermore,
a cash-basis orientation results in consumers’ underestimating the
significance of relatively small amounts of money or cash.144 The least
well-off borrowers who have been the past victims of institutional
exclusion and economic stereotyping would benefit from credit options that
did not capitalize on their cash-basis orientation in a way that promotes
their exploitation. For them, a true democratization of credit would entail
liberation from the tyranny of the cash economy, not simply greater access
to formal credit markets. These conclusions will be explored in the rest of
this Article.
III. THE TYRANNY OF THE CASH ECONOMY
A. The Social Meaning and Economic Value of Cash
Depending upon the kind and quantity of assets and resources at its
disposal, a group of people will develop a set of tastes, preferences, cultural
understandings, and practices regarding money and personal finance that
tend to facilitate its achievement of or accommodation to a given place or
status in society.145 The kind (cultural, social, political, or economic) and
amount of capital a group possesses roughly determines the habits that the
group will acquire over time and through practice.146 The habits adopted in
142. See discussion infra Part III.B (describing the deeply embedded cultural values that
give rise to the preferences of those operating in the cash economy).
143. See discussion infra Part III.B (suggesting that participants in the cash economy feel
alienated from the mainstream financial world).
144. See discussion infra Part III.A (describing the low social value of cash and the
stigma attached to large amounts of cash).
145. This discussion relies heavily on sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus.
PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 169-75
(Richard Nice trans., 1984) (1979). Bourdieu refers to the practices and preferences of a
group with regard to a particular area of endeavor like personal finance and economics as its
“habitus.” Id. According to Bourdieu, a “habitus is necessity internalized and converted
into a disposition that generates meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions.” Id.
at 170. A habitus is the relationship between the “capacity to produce classifiable practices
and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products
(taste).” Id. See also Alan Aldridge, Habitus and Cultural Capital in the Field of Personal
Finance, 46 SOC. REV. 1, 12-21 (1998), for an application of Bourdieu’s theories to the field
of personal finance and an argument that product design and marketing compensate for
consumers’ lack of cultural and social capital in the field.
146. In Bourdieu’s topology, capital is not limited to the economic. See BOURDIEU,
supra note 145, at 114-15 (describing class differences as the product of different sets of the
various types of capital, including cultural, social, and economic). Indeed, “capital” can be
any “accumulated assets, resources, sources of strength, or advantages.” WEBSTER’S THIRD
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one area (such as personal finance) will bear an affinity to habits embraced
in other fields of endeavor (such as work, leisure, home furnishings, and
food consumption). The sum total of these habits will essentially generate
a lifestyle by which the group classifies itself and is classified by others.147
The form of money to which a group has access has substantial bearing
on the financial preferences and practices the group takes up.148 There are
many forms of money circulating in our economy—cash, checks, credit
cards, debit cards, ATM cards, smart cards, and cybermoney. They vary
with regard to their sophistication, the distances and speed with which they
travel, the amount transactions typically involved, and the formality of the
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 332 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 1993). Noneconomic forms of capital, such as cultural, social, political, or symbolic capital, may be
converted into economic capital although they are created through autonomous processes
that are not dependent on economic capital. Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in THE
HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241, 243 (John
G. Richardson ed., 1986).
Cultural capital includes habits of style, taste, manners, social competence or confidence,
and self-assurance, as well as the institutional mechanisms to define and to legitimate the
values and standards on which all sorts of qualitative assessments of social distinction are
drawn. See generally BOURDIEU, supra note 145. Cultural capital is produced by
socialization and education. See id. at 80-96 (exploring the relationship between
educational capital and cultural capital that is inherited). For example, the cultural capital
imparted to the children of the petite bourgeoisie includes an understanding and appreciation
of the values and practices of entrepreneurship and money management. See, e.g., IVAN
LIGHT & STEVEN J. GOLD, ETHNIC ECONOMIES 92-93 (2000). This gives the offspring of the
petite bourgeoisie the tools with which the class can reproduce itself. Id.
Unlike human capital, which rather directly increases a person’s productivity, cultural
capital’s relationship to economic well-being is more attenuated. Cultural capital generates
prestige and recognition which can lead to advantageous employment, marriages, and
business contacts which in turn can translate into material wealth. Id. at 91.
Social capital, on the other hand, is “a capital of social connections, honourability [sic]
and respectability.” BOURDIEU, supra note 145, at 122. It is created by social networks and
sustained by exchanges, mutual obligations, and shared identities that in essence pay off in
terms of support and access to resources. LIGHT & GOLD, supra, at 110-11. “Denoting the
web of connections, loyalties, and mutual obligations (shared fate, solidarity, and communal
membership) that develop among people as part of their regular interaction, social capital
refers to the sense of commitment that induces people to extend favors, expect preferential
treatment, and look out for one another’s interests.” Id. at 110.
Social capital is a much debated and contentious concept in the social sciences. See, e.g.,
Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Application in Modern Sociology, 24
ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 3, 21 (1998) (reviewing the spectrum of writing on the subject of social
capital and its importance in discourse on “public civicness [sic]”). Portes argues that the
negative consequences of social capital are often overlooked. Id. at 15-18, 21-22. “Social
ties can bring about greater control over wayward behavior and provide privileged access to
resources; they can also restrict individual freedoms and bar outsiders from gaining access
to the same resources through particularistic preference.” Id. at 21. Moreover, groups, in
addition to individuals, may possess social capital. Id. at 18-21. Racial/ethnic and feminist
solidarity or group identification are forms of group social capital. Id. at 9. According to
Portes, however, there is a tendency on the part of some scholars to view social capital as a
panacea that will cure the ills of unorganized poor and socially or politically marginalized
communities. Id. Social capital may be evidence of the existence of civic virtue and social
integration in a community and not its cause. Id. at 19-21.
147. BOURDIEU, supra note 145, at 172-73.
148. Id. at 173.
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transactions in which they are employed. Imagine, if you will, $1, $1,000,
$100,000, and $1,000,000 in each form of money listed above. The
amounts might be equivalent, but the social and economic value or
significance of the amounts certainly differs. It follows that the form of
money in which an individual or a group commonly conducts commercial
transactions both reflects and constructs its social standing. The lower the
economic wealth or earnings of a person or group, the more primitive the
form of money in which the person or group transacts business and the
more expensive those transactions tend to be.149 Individuals and groups
possessing limited amounts of money or money of a lower social value
tend to adopt more simplistic modes of transacting business or engaging in
commercial dealings.150 Furthermore, the kind of money they have at their
disposal also determines how they value money and their attitudes toward
money.151
In terms of social value, cash is the least sophisticated, least efficient,
and least productive form of money. When we think of cash, we envision
small amounts of money that will fit into a wallet, a cookie jar, the opening
in a mattress, or a passbook savings account. When we think of cash in
large amounts, we envision stacks of bills that have been illegally obtained
or accumulated in the criminal or underground economies and that must be
laundered or destigmatized. Cash is meant to be spent or saved; it is
largely a tool of consumption, not an instrument of investment. If one has
money and does not know what to do with it, it might as well be cash. The
requirement that cash transactions of $10,000 or more be reported to the
Treasury Department has burned into the popular imagination the tie
between cash and crime.152 This requirement, which was directed at
exposing criminal activity, reduces cash’s currency or capacity to circulate
as a medium of exchange and accordingly its value. The decrease in
149. JACK WEATHERFORD, THE HISTORY OF MONEY: FROM SANDSTONE TO CYBERSPACE
249 (1997). See generally JAN PAHL, INVISIBLE MONEY: FAMILY FINANCES IN THE
ELECTRONIC ECONOMY (1999) (reporting on the results of a qualitative study involving
thousands of British families which revealed that the form of money used (cash, cheques,
credit cards, debit cards, smart cards, loyalty cards) varied with the gender, income, and
employment status of the individual family member in such a way that husbands and wives
had access to different amounts of money and potentially different standards of living).
150. See PAHL, supra note 149, at vii-viii (indicating that middle income groups tend to
use forms of money that are passed over by high income groups and may be unavailable to
low income groups).
151. See id. at viii (indicating that low income groups may respond to credit in different
ways, either in a carefree manner or with greater anxiety than more affluent groups).
152. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-53 (1994). See generally United
States v. One Lot of United States Currency Totaling $14,665, 33 F. Supp. 2d 47, 49 (D.
Mass. 1998) (denying forfeiture under drug laws of a large sum of cash in small bills,
wrapped in rubber bands, seized from a young Hispanic man stopped by airport security).
The man claimed that he had cash because he was having trouble with his bank and intended
to use the funds for a down payment on a home in his destination. Id. at 50-51.
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efficacy impacts large amounts of cash that are lawfully acquired, even if
they are too small to trigger the reporting requirement. This particularly
affects the money of working class people whose savings take the form of
cash because they distrust or do not understand financial institutions.153
B. The Cultural Orientation of Cash-Basis Consumers
We know a bit about the practices and preferences of poorer minority
consumers who do most of their commercial transactions with cash. Such
consumers are confined to inferior markets not only for goods and services
but also for money and credit. As a result of institutional exclusion, they
have developed several noteworthy predilections. First, they favor face-toface cash transactions over those involving greater anonymity and less
tangible forms of money. Second, they have limited involvement with
mainstream financial institutions whose accounts are not tailored to meet
their needs and whose fee structures they particularly distrust. Third, they
experience a sense of powerlessness and alienation where financial matters
are concerned.
The black poor’s penchant for cash is revealed by a study conducted by
economist John Caskey of the financial practices of eighteen low-tomoderate-income blacks in a small town in northeastern Mississippi.154
Caskey found that many of his informants preferred to operate on what he
termed a “cash-and-carry basis.”155 They cashed their pay or benefit
checks, paid their bills, and carried the remainder in the form of cash until
the next pay or benefits day.156 They felt that they had more control over
their money if they kept it in cash rather than put it in the bank.157 It was
easier for them to physically count their money than it was to keep track of
it mentally or to balance a check book.158 They also found banks slow in
crediting deposits to their accounts.159 Of course, there is a downside to
153. A Milwaukee consumer credit activist made this point in describing continuing
barriers to credit; she stated that “some lenders still question where a minority could get
money for a downpayment particularly when it is in cash . . . [I]n her culture (she is a
Latina) some Mexicans do not trust banks. So they keep money at home ‘in coffee cans.’”
GREGORY D. SQUIRES & SALLY O’CONNOR, COLOR AND MONEY: POLITICS AND PROSPECTS
FOR COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT IN URBAN AMERICA 20 (2001). In her view, though,
lenders were increasingly finding such “mattress money” to be acceptable. Id.; see also
Hastick, supra note 79, at 123, 129 (describing how susu or ROSCA funds are being
accepted as down payments when supported with documentation and how susu participation
is being taken as evidence of creditworthiness).
154. JOHN P. CASKEY, BEYOND CASH-AND-CARRY: FINANCIAL SAVINGS, FINANCIAL
SERVICES, AND LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN TWO COMMUNITIES ii (Report to the Consumer
Federation of American and the Ford Foundation, Dec. 1997).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 15.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 17.
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cash-and-carry. Protecting one’s cash from burglars and thieves is a
concern in some households and communities. 160 Moreover, budgeting
may be difficult.161 Accounting for expenditures is harder, and people are
more cavalier about redirecting or reallocating cash from one purpose to
another, as opposed to money in the bank.162 The timing of receipt of the
cash and the due date for the payment of obligations may not coincide;
maintaining cash in hand to meet future obligations may be difficult.163
Finally, cash does not earn interest like money in a savings account.
For many poorer consumers, the “choice” of a cash-and-carry existence
makes good sense given the unsatisfactory alternatives (checking accounts,
savings accounts, ATM cards). Caskey found that people who did not have
bank accounts had little in the way of savings, could not satisfy the
minimum balance requirement, and found the monthly maintenance fees
problematic.164 Losing money through bank fees and charges is a source of
anxiety that makes lower income consumers wary of banks and other
deposit institutions.165 ATM cards attached to checking accounts also raise
worries. It is easy to lose track of one’s balance and to bounce checks as a
result. Moreover, using the ATM of a bank other than one’s own is
expensive. Finally, someone might steal the ATM card and wipe out the
depositor’s balance.166
Responding to the inadequacies of prime sector institutions and catering
to the preferences of customers socialized in the ways of the cash economy,
subprime firms offer financial services that make them the institutions of
choice even for some borrowers who actually have alternatives. Among
the features that customers find desirable are better locations and more
favorable operating hours than top-tier firms;167 less stringent risk160. LINDA F. ALWITT & THOMAS D. DONLEY, THE LOW-INCOME CONSUMER:
THE BALANCE OF EXCHANGE 97 (1996).

ADJUSTING

161. See id. (explaining that people divert cash from their original purpose to
extracurricular activities with few or no problems).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. JOHN P. CASKEY, LOWER INCOME AMERICANS, HIGHER COST FINANCIAL SERVICES 21
(Report for The Center for Credit Union Research and The Filene Research Institute, 1997).
Loss of privacy and the fear of having money attached to satisfy a judgment for debt or
child support have also been cited as explanations by those lacking transaction accounts.
Jeanne M. Hogarth & Kevin H. O’Connell, Banking Relationships of Lower-Income
Families and the Governmental Trend Toward Electronic Payment, 85 FED. RES. BULL. 459,
463 (1999).
165. Cathleen M. Finn et al., Assets and Financial Management Among Poor
Households in Extreme Poverty Neighborhoods, J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE, Dec. 1994, at 75,
84.
166. CASKEY, supra note 164, at 18-19.
167. See SQUIRES & O’CONNOR, supra note 153, at 153-56 (indicating that a survey
conducted in Milwaukee’s Community Development Block Grant neighborhoods revealed
that, while the banks were open forty-four hours per week, including 2.7 hours on the
weekend and 0.5 hours in the evening, the check cashing businesses were open sixty-eight

AUSTIN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1248

1/17/2005 11:17:48 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1217

screening procedures;168 and swifter approvals.169 All of these factors
increase the cost of the credit. Limited credit evaluations and the cash
basis on which the firms conduct business reduce the paper trail and limit
intrusions into the customers’ privacy. The firms, for their part, insure their
profitability by delivering narrowly specialized services, concentrating
their marketing efforts on attracting prior users, scheduling payments to
coincide with the customer’s cash flow to assure that they will be paid
before the customer has a chance to spend the money, structuring the deals
to facilitate the transfer of collateral, monitoring payments closely, and
responding to nonpayment swiftly and aggressively.170
The lenders’ informal operations are deceptive. Many are corporate
entities connected to larger banks and financial institutions. As one
commentator noted regarding a check-cashing outlet in a Washington, D.C.
neighborhood, “[t]he primitive hands-on processing and tawdry exterior of
the outlets both exude welcome to poor customers and mask [the firm’s]
close ties to and substantial financing from large corporations and big
banks, as well as the fact that it is part of a large corporate chain.”171 The
firms’ chief advantage, of course, may be that their customers are unaware
of the greater expenses entailed in the frequent small payments such firms
require over an extended period of time.172 This myopia is a result of a
cash-basis orientation.
It is significant to consumers that firms in the alternative sector tend to
operate on a cash-basis. Poorer consumers are most comfortable
transacting with cash. Cash fosters intimate or personal social relations.
Handling cash and exchanging it with others creates social connections that
are a significant aspect of their lifestyle.173 Cash is tangible evidence of
one’s contribution to one’s family and community, and to the economy in
general; direct deposit schemes that eliminate the need for face-to-face
transacting do not have the same testimonial impact. Going to the check
hours per week, including 13.1 hours on the weekend and 2.5 hours in the evening making
such firms more attractive for customers despite their holding accounts at other institutions).
168. CASKEY, supra note 164, at 19. In lieu of formal credit reports, these institutions
may rely on the word of community references or trade information among themselves. Id.
at 33.
169. Id. These include friendly personal service, informal settings, and faster approval.
Also, all transactions are in cash which does not leave a paper or an electronic trail. Id. at
23, 52-53.
170. Id. at 51-52.
171. Brett Williams, What’s Debt Got to Do with It?, in THE NEW POVERTY STUDIES:
THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF POWER, POLITICS, AND IMPOVERISHED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES
79, 87 (Judith Goode & Jeff Maskovsky eds., 2001).
172. CASKEY, supra note 164, at 19, 53.
173. See TAD CRAWFORD, THE SECRET LIFE OF MONEY: TEACHING TALES OF SPENDING,
RECEIVING, SAVING, AND OWNING 221 (1994) (finding in tangible money a connection to
other people and the divine, as well as a sign of “what is fertile in our world and in
ourselves”).
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casher or dropping into the rent-to-own store represents a social occasion.
“Fictive friendships” between customers and staff bring the customers back
again and again.174 The cash economy is ideal for people with more time
than money, or to put it more crassly, for people whose time is not worth
much on the labor market.
The resort of poorer consumers to the firms of the alternative market is
consistent with reports that they feel manipulated, angry, powerless, and
alienated when it comes to dealing with financial institutions.175 This
leaves them susceptible to manipulation and abuse.176 Snubbed by the
primary sector, some poorer consumers are more pride-conscious than
price-conscious and are therefore susceptible to the appeal of the secondary
sector’s “merchandising of respect.”177 Though there is minimal difference
between the “merchandising of respect” and the “marketing of relationship
banking” which is directed at the more desirable consumers of top tier
services, the latter start out with more choices.178 Moreover, because
poorer consumers generally possess limited financial literacy and tend to
simplify or ignore incongruous details where the overall terms of the
transaction are likely to be unfavorable,179 they often have little
understanding of the contracts they sign.180 They are more concerned with
whether their periodic payments are manageable than with the actual
interest rate charged. But their options are limited and doing business with
the institutions of the subprime market may offer these consumers “their
only opportunity to enjoy the consumer fruits of the longest economic
expansion in American history.”181

174. See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 188 (indicating that sales techniques and patterns of
social power distribution rather than the socio-economic risk factors become the primary
cause of higher prices in lower income markets).
175. See ALWITT & DONLEY, supra note 160, at 67 (describing how poor people perceive
themselves and their financial position particularly with respect to outside aid and
assistance); see also Ronald Paul Hill & Debra Lynn Stephens, Impoverished Consumers
and Consumer Behavior: The Case of AFDC Mothers, J. MACROMARKETING, Fall 1997, at
32, 34, 40-41 (finding that female welfare recipients experience a loss of control and
feelings of alienation and humiliation when their position is exposed through the use of
stigmatized forms of money such as food stamps and vouchers).
176. ALWITT & DONLEY, supra note 160, at 69.
177. ROBERT C. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S
ADDICTION TO CREDIT 200-02 (2000). See generally Hill & Stephens, supra note 175, at 41
(relating the consequences of social stigmatization of lower income individuals).
178. MANNING, supra note 177, at 202.
179. ALWITT & THOMAS D. DONLEY, supra note 160, at 120.
180. See Ronald P. Hill et al., The Rent-to-Own Industry and Pricing Disclosure Tactics,
17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 3, 4-6 (1998) (explaining the difficulty that some consumers
have in understanding the intricacies of rent-to-own contracts and the higher prices of such
contracts versus the direct purchase of the goods from first-tier retailers).
181. MANNING, supra note 177, at 209.
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C. The Association Between Blacks and Cash
The habits and assumptions of poorer minority consumers described
above are not necessarily shared by all of those who use check cashers or
take out payday loans. Payday loan customers are certainly not among the
poorest consumers of financial services because they must have checking
accounts even to be eligible for a loan.182 The habits learned in the cash
economy though may outlive the material conditions that gave birth to
them if institutional exclusion persists or if the social and cultural capital
required to support a more sophisticated orientation to credit and money are
not allowed to develop.
For example, black people in general tend to be associated with cash.183
This is a legacy of their historic exclusion from full participation in the
economy.184 Blacks have long been stereotyped as being “impulsive, funloving, indulgent, and wasteful consumers”185 “who could not have money
without spending it immediately.”186 Blacks are accordingly assumed not
to know the value of money or how to deal with financial matters in a
knowledgeable way. Such notions about blacks and their money facilitate
efforts to confine their commercial transactions to the cash economy.
Moreover, the association between blacks and cash makes it more difficult
for blacks to establish credibility and trust with regard to transactions
involving substantial sums of money or necessitating credit. Credit is thus
harder for them to obtain.187 Conversely, it is easier for others to negotiate
or bargain successfully with blacks if black people’s money is treated like
cash or its equivalents. The money would obviously be put to a better,

182. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 123 (2004)
(describing payday loan consumers as “underbanked” because they lack the knowledge to
avoid subprime or fringe credit).
183. See Sheila D. Ards & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., The Color of Money: Bad Credit,
Wealth, and Race, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 223, 224 (2001) (describing that a “common
misconception within the social science community” regarding the cause of lower incomes,
home ownership rates, access to credit, and higher credit denial rates of African Americans
is attributable solely to poor credit).
184. See Ards & Myers, Jr., supra note 183, at 227-28, 233 (noting that blacks have
historically been denied credit because lenders deem them untrustworthy). The exclusion of
blacks has led to “an environment of poor credit habits” for blacks. Id.
185. TED OWNBY, AMERICAN DREAMS IN MISSISSIPPI: CONSUMERS, POVERTY & CULTURE
1830-1998 4-5 (1999).
186. Id. at 5.
187. See generally Austin, supra note 1 (arguing that the social conceptualization of
“black people’s money” in terms of the quality (mostly cash) and quantity of funds available
to black negatively impacts their ability to obtain credit); see also Regina Austin, “A Nation
of Thieves:” Securing Black People’s Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994
UTAH L. REV. 147, 149 (describing difficulties blacks encounter in making purchases with
checks); Ards & Myers, Jr., supra note 183, at 225 (arguing that the erroneous perception
that blacks have poor credit limits their access to loans). But see Ards & Myers, Jr., id., at
234 (discussing research that suggests that blacks have less difficulty obtaining credit cards
than maintaining good credit).
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higher use in the hands of a nonblack person who can amass it and turn it
into capital. Add to this the impact of the association between blacks and
crime or dishonesty188 and it becomes clear why black people’s money is
treated as tainted, and, as with a fetish subject to a taboo, is considered
sanitized or restored to full value only when it passes into the hands of
whites.189
If the notion that discrimination inheres in the very way we think about
black people’s money is unconvincing, the subject might be approached in
terms of general racist stereotyping. A belief in black intellectual
inferiority makes investments in black people, their property, and their
communities seem riskier than comparable investments in whites.190 A
belief that black borrowers are stupid or incompetent will lead to more
refusals to lend, higher interest rates, demands for more information, and
higher transaction costs in credit transactions involving blacks.191 Some
blacks have internalized these notions.192 Others have accommodated their
financial practices and preferences to them.193 Fear of being denied credit,
for example, drives some creditworthy blacks to seek loans in the fringe or
subprime sector where they receive money on less favorable terms than
comparably situated whites.194 Yet a third group has eschewed full
participation in the market for financial services.195 It does not matter;
through any of these responses, the economic subjugation of a substantial
number of blacks is assured.
Blacks’ exclusion from full participation in the market for financial
services is a byproduct of their historical confinement to the cash economy.
That exclusion and confinement have produced, via socialization, patterns
of financial behavior that facilitate the continued economic marginalization
of black people. The cash-basis orientation is cultural. Culture is created
by, as well as being manifested in, the workings of families, communities,
188. See Austin, supra note 1 (exploring the impact of stereotypes linking blacks to
crime in lowering the social and material value of their money); see also Austin, supra note
187, at 151-52 (noting that those tasked with security surveillance in retail establishments
engage in racial profiling under the assumption that the majority of lawbreakers are black);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1952-54 (1993)
(noting that race is not only used to identify criminals but also the crimes they commit).
189. See generally Austin, supra note 1 (propounding a cultural theory of black people’s
money as being the equivalent of a fetish subject to a taboo).
190. MARCELLUS ANDREWS, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOPE AND FEAR: CAPITALISM
AND THE BLACK CONDITION IN AMERICA 77 (1999).
191. Id. at 77-78.
192. Ards & Myers, Jr., supra note 183, at 238.
193. See id. at 229 (noting that blacks, excluded from prime credit opportunities, have
historically resorted to increased savings behavior).
194. Id. at 229-30, 238.
195. See id. at 233-34 (discussing focus group research that observed the common lack
of participation in credit and lending among blacks, especially with regard to merchant
credit cards).
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markets, and governments. Of course, impoverished material conditions
spawn an impoverished or impoverishing culture. Both material conditions
and the culture must change for the cycle to be broken.
D. Ending the Tyranny of the Cash Economy
Small-sum borrowers who deal with predatory lenders should not be
viewed as totally “cash-dazzled, payment-myopic borrower[s].”196 A wad
of borrowed cash does not cause them to forget where the money is coming
from and how much it is costing them. They are not overcome by an
immediate urge to spend because they suddenly have cash in hand.
Moreover, their cash-basis orientation and the preference for informality
that it generates would appear to have some positive aspects from the
perspective of the borrowers. For example, focusing solely on consumer
abuse tends to underestimate the benefits of the expanded credit offered by
firms in the alternative market. Purchasers who shop at rent-to-own stores,
for example, pay several times the cost of an item, but rent-to-own stores
may provide them with their only opportunity to participate in consumer
culture by obtaining access to products that nearly everyone else enjoys.
Moreover, flexibility is a valuable attribute of rent-to-own contracts; the
purchaser can walk away from the debt at any time.197
The important point here is that cash-basis consumers and those
socialized in the ways of the cash economy possess certain constraints and
certain mindsets and habits that affect their ability to negotiate successfully
in the market for credit, especially the sector populated by subprime
lenders. A possible solution to their woes lies in either increasing their
access to financial services supplied by firms in the primary sector or
regulating the subprime sector to produce behavior more like that exhibited
by firms in the primary sector. Breaking the hold of the tyranny of the
values of the cash economy through consumer education and exposure to
alternatives might also facilitate their economic well-being. There is a
further possibility: expanding small-sum borrowers’ credit options by
taking into account their preferences, infusing the values of informality into
the notion of the democratization of credit (a concept that the lenders like
to invoke), and creating new hybrid sources of credit that deliver a better
mix of the advantages of the formal and the informal.

196. PETERSON, supra note 14, at 171.
197. See generally Brian J. Zikmun-Fisher & Andrew M. Parker, Demand for Rent-toOwn Contracts: A Behavorial Economic Explanation, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 199
(1999) (discussing escapability and structured payments as factors explaining households’
use of rent-to-own transactions); Hill et al., supra note 180, at 6-8 (noting that accessibility
of retailers and terminability of contracts are seen as benefits of shopping at rent-to-own
retailers).
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As the next section makes clear, the benefits of informality are not
limited to fast approvals and face-to-face contracting. The benefits of
informality also include the embeddedness of the lender in the local
community and in the social relationships that promote financial decisions
which acknowledge the value of the reciprocity of respect and
responsibility; flexibility (as to lender structure and the mode of
transacting) that compensates for and corrects, rather than exploits, the
borrowers’ lack of financial sophistication; and involvement of creditors or
intermediaries representing debtors in activities that link borrowing for
consumption to the generation and control of income and wealth for and by
the community and its citizen-consumers.
IV. REINTERPRETING THE “DEMOCRATIZATION OF CREDIT” TO INCLUDE
THE INFORMAL
Firms in the subprime or fringe credit market assert that they are
promoting the democratization of credit.198 This, however, is a disputable
proposition. At a minimum, the democratization of credit should provide
“credit-constrained” consumers with “access to previously unavailable
credit on more competitive and attractive terms.”199 The industry’s critics
charge that the credit being offered by subprime lenders is “destructive,”
not “productive,” and therefore not consistent with the democratization of
credit as properly understood.200
The concept of the “democratization of credit” is not new.201
Regrettably, its contemporary manifestation departs from the ideals with

198. See, e.g., Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Predatory Mortgage Lending: Summary of
Legislative and Regulatory Activity, Including Testimony on Subprime Mortgage Lending
Before the House Banking Committee, 1242 PRACTICING L. INST. 9, 40 (2001) (recounting
testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Banking and
Financial Services that the subprime home equity market has not met the needs of lowincome and minority borrowers).
199. Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 98 (2000)
(noting the increased use of credit cards over other forms of short term borrowing).
200. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 6, at 665; see also Mansfield, supra note 198, at 41.
201. For example, an article in the April 1914 issue of the journal, Current Opinion,
linked the democratization of credit in America to the creation of formal institutions and
instruments like savings banks or Morris Plans, which extended money to honest working
“people of little means” or “men of small, if not the smallest, account financially . . . on
terms virtually as easy and as dignified as those on which the man of property borrows
money at an ordinary commercial bank.” The Democratization of Credit, CURRENT
OPINION, Apr. 1914, at 313-14. Democratized credit, a phenomenon already a half century
old in Europe at this point, was a device for thwarting predatory, informal loan-sharking.
Id. at 314-15. Under the Morris Plans, a borrower needed two responsible persons to
endorse the transaction and to guarantee the repayment of the loan. CHARLES CORZELLE,
THE SMALL LOAN RACKETT 20 (1934). This requirement “discourage[d] promiscuous and
habitual borrowing.” Id. at 21. Furthermore, repayment could be made in installments. Id.
at 20. The interest was assessed when the loan was made, which “prevented the charging of
high interest when loans were not repaid upon the due date.” Id.
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which the term was originally associated. An analysis of the grassroots
campaign waged by the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) in
the 1970s to obtain access to store credit for its members provides a good
illustration of this.202 Though the material benefits generated by the
NWRO campaign were local and sporadic, it nonetheless achieved an
important symbolic victory.203 The NWRO conceptualized consumer credit
as “a right of American citizenship.”204 The welfare mothers it represented
wanted to be treated like anyone else; to them buying with credit should
have been “normal” even for welfare recipients.205 In its quest for credit,
the NWRO targeted low-end retailers including Sears, Montgomery Ward,
and Lerner Shops, and local department stores like Wanamaker’s and
Filene’s.206 It sought credit from large merchants so that welfare mothers
could bypass small local or neighborhood merchants who charged high
prices and delivered poor quality goods.207 As a feature of its national
campaign, the NWRO proposed that local chapters would serve as informal
credit intermediaries between merchants and its members for whom the
NWRO would supply letters of reference that would suffice as proof of the
applicants’ creditworthiness.208
The goals of the NWRO credit campaign were not limited to the
economic. “[I]n advocating that poor people had the right to credit—even
if it meant risking debt—welfare rights activists distinguished themselves
from the more paternalistic experts dedicated to safeguarding low-income
consumers from exploitative retailers as well as their own appetites as
consumers.”209 According to historian Felicia Kornbluh, “for middle and
working class people, access to credit (and the denial of credit to others)
was part of their sense of respectability. When NWRO members
demanded Sears credit cards they asked to be included among the
respectable.”210 Moreover, the “[w]elfare rights activists saw themselves as
entitled to credit because they were entitled to social recognition [as

202. See generally Felicia Kornbluh, Black Buying Power:
Welfare Rights,
Consumerism, and Northern Protest, in FREEDOM NORTH: BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLES
OUTSIDE THE SOUTH, 1940-1980 199 (Jeanne Theoharis & Komozi Woodward eds., 2003).
The activists of the NWRO resorted to traditional movement tactics like leafleting, businessdisrupting shop-ins, and credit card burning by wealthier supporters to support their claims
for credit. Id. at 207.
203. Id. at 205-08.
204. Id. at 210.
205. Id. at 209.
206. Id. at 205-06.
207. Id. at 205.
208. Id. at 206.
209. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION
IN POSTWAR AMERICA 381 (2003).
210. Kornbluh, supra note 202, at 209.
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women and mothers] in a consumer society.”211 The campaign for credit
expressed their “deep yearning for social inclusion in post-war society.”212
The democratization of credit is generally spoken of in terms of uplift
and advancement, or so it should be. It calls for an infusion of democratic
values into the private market and a broader sharing of the benefits of the
society’s economic endowments by a wider spectrum of consumers. This
is one of the reasons why access to credit is considered part of the social
safety net. Ideally, democratized credit should leave those who use it in a
better position to negotiate the formal market and to improve their ability to
save, acquire assets, invest, and otherwise amass wealth.
The democratization of credit is an essential component of a modern
economic regime. It is required to produce citizens who are economically
modern. “[S]kills in money management and access, plus knowledge of
financial products and systems, are fast becoming part of a necessary
financial literacy essential for full social participation and survival.”213 The
democratization of credit should accordingly dismantle or challenge
economic stereotypes and make access to money easier for groups whose
lack of creditworthiness stems from past racial and gender discrimination
in the allocation of material resources.
Payday loans, for example, as we have seen, are not an assured
mechanism for lifting borrowers above the disadvantages of the informal
devices they would otherwise employ to deal with debt; moreover, payday
loans seem to add to borrowers’ troubles the disadvantages of formal
lending. Payday loans simply do not guarantee that borrowers can advance
to the next level of financial advantage, security, or sophistication. Rather,
they too often exacerbate borrowers’ desperation and economic
marginality, and exploit borrowers’ sometimes rudimentary or simplistic
orientation to money and credit. Those debtors who successfully satisfy
their obligations under payday loans do not even get credit for their
reliability, as their success in extinguishing their debts is not reflected on
their credit records. This fact stems from the informal nature of payday
borrowing.214

211. Id. at 211.
212. Id. at 214.
213. Ruth Pearson, Micro-credit as a Path from Welfare to Work: The Experience of the
Full Circle Project, UK, in WOMEN AND CREDIT, supra note 76, at 167, 175. Jones & SakyiDawson, supra note 76, at 167, 175 (emphasis deleted).
214. See Richard Brooks, Credit Where It’s Due, FORBES, Apr. 12, 2004, at 52 (arguing
that payday lenders deny their customers “access to the traditional credit markets” by not
reporting favorable dispositions of their debts which would allow the borrowers to build a
positive credit history). But see Michelle Singletary, Earning Credit for Paying Rent,
WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2004, at F1 (describing Pay Rent, Build Credit, Inc., a credit bureau
that allows consumers to build a credit history based on the timely payment of obligations
like rent and utility bills).
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If the democratization of credit were truly the goal, the reform agenda
would extend beyond usury regulation and suitability requirements. It
would include alternatives that acknowledge the orientations that
consumers bring to financial transactions and work to change them by
drawing upon what is positive about them. Black people’s exclusion from
full participation in the financial services market has resulted in the absence
of the material conditions that give rise to and sustain the cultural and
social capital needed to facilitate greater financial literacy, sophistication,
and security among blacks of all classes.215 Many poor and/or minority
communities lack access to reliable and trustworthy formal external sources
of credit, information, and expertise and are accordingly vulnerable to
overreaching, underdevelopment, and depreciation of the value of their
money. This is not the result of their choice or their deficiencies, but rather
a consequence of the material conditions in which they acquired their
financial habits. Promoting savings and strengthening pro-debtor sources
of credit that preserve the benefits of informality would reduce the demand
for credit from formal entities like payday lenders and car title
pawnbrokers.
Linking formal sector firms with informal local
intermediaries would allow the firms to achieve greater penetration in
minority markets and give borrowers the benefit of knowledgeable sources
of protection.216 The poor and working class might benefit from
“innovative lending schemes that use community monitoring and
enforcement to mimic the [benefits and advantages of the] informal lending
sector.”217 Of course, the market for credit, like many other commodities,
cannot truly be democratized without changing existing power relations,
particularly with regard to production.218 The local financial intermediaries
might prove useful in pursuing
a strategy of coalition building that enables those on the economic or
social margins to strike an enforceable bargain with better-off economic
players. Such bargains exchange the untapped resources and ability of
marginal consumers or workers for the means needed to develop their
productivity and a safety net that makes sustained participation
possible.219

Cultural mechanisms need to be fostered to encourage consumers
socialized in the ways of the cash economy to think of their money as being

215. ANDREWS, supra note 190, at 3.
216. Jones & Sakyi-Dawson, supra note 76, at 167, 175.
217. BOND & TOWNSEND, supra note 94, at 19.
218. See COHEN, supra note 209, at 309 (noting that, although advertisers and marketers
began to recognize diversity and segment the market in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to
market democratization, ownership remained concentrated in large manufacturers).
219. Frank Munger, How Can We Save the Safety Net?, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 543, 581
(2004).
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significant, even if it is only cash. Blacks are not alone in having a lower
value attached to their money. Other minorities, including women and the
poor, are essentially in the same boat. To elevate their money’s social
significance, all of us must begin to think and talk about money in the
hands of members of these groups in a different way. It is impossible for a
group to build cultural and social capital in regard to its money if we
dissociate them from money; harbor stereotypes about their money, its
sources, or its uses; or denounce money with “righteous indignation” in the
mistaken belief that their cause will be advanced thereby. It is better to
think of money as a complex social invention and a cultural artifact not
totally unresponsive to collective agency. Money might be viewed as, in
the words of Carl Sandberg, “power, freedom, a cushion, the root of all
evil, the sum of blessings.”220
V. CONCLUSION
This Article makes three points. First, predatory lenders thrive by taking
advantage of their customers’ familiarity and comfort with, and resulting
preference for, informal modes of transacting. Of course, there is
deception involved in this because in many cases the corporate identity of
the real party in interest is not disclosed to the borrower and the formality
of the transaction becomes clear only after the customer defaults. Second,
in the case of minority customers in particular, the preference for
informality in financial transactions is an aspect of the powerful
socialization of the cash economy to which these customers and their
parents and grandparents have been confined because of racial and class
discrimination. The preference will theoretically be affected by a change in
the material circumstances of the customers, particularly by greater access
to trustworthy sources of credit. Because the habits and practices will
outlive the material conditions that spawned them, however, it is important
that the positive aspects of informality be employed to stop the exploitation
and to begin the economic integration of such small-sum borrowers.
Furthermore, initiatives for ending the devaluation of minority customers’
money should also enhance their financial advancement. Third, the true
democratization of credit, which predatory lending does not represent,
should foster the enhanced well-being for the least-well off borrowers.
Those borrowers very likely need the protection of informality to become
full citizen-consumers in the modern economy in which credit plays an
important role in contributing to the social safety net protecting the most
vulnerable debtors and thereby assuring a good life for ever more
Americans.
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